



GARDA  
INSPECTORATE

PROMOTING EXCELLENCE & ACCOUNTABILITY

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Report of the Garda  
Síochána Inspectorate

RESOURCE  
ALLOCATION

OCTOBER

09

# THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GARDA SÍOCHÁNA INSPECTORATE IS:

**'To ensure that the resources available to the Garda Síochána are used so as to achieve and maintain the highest levels of efficiency and effectiveness in its operation and administration, as measured by reference to the best standards of comparable police services.'**

**s. 117 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005)**



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# FOREWORD

On the day I was appointed Chief Inspector of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate in May, 2006, a representative of the media asked me, “Do we need more police in Ireland?” I responded, “First, we need to consider what the police we have now are doing, particularly those on the front lines.” That is precisely what the Inspectorate attempted to do during this review of resource allocation in the Garda Síochána – determine the demands on front line policing in Ireland and make recommendations to improve service to the community.

The Inspectorate has consistently acknowledged the strengths of the Garda Síochána, particularly its deep community roots and crime fighting abilities. The Inspectorate’s purpose is to bring forward strategic recommendations that help build on that solid foundation. This report contains suggestions that will enhance front-line policing and provide better value for money.

In developing the recommendations in this report, the Inspectorate recognised that these are very difficult financial times and there is limited scope to fund change proposals. At the same time, the Inspectorate did not avoid making recommendations that have cost implications where spending will be necessary to realise greater efficiency and bring Garda systems in line with international police practice. For instance, while acknowledging the reduction in capital appropriation, the Inspectorate is convinced that investment is required to plug serious gaps in

Garda technology. In policing, computer aided dispatch systems and resource information systems are not luxury items. They are standard technologies that have been in place in most police agencies in Europe and North America for decades and are essential to effective police administration and operations. Because the Garda Síochána lacks these technologies, it took the Inspectorate well over a year to compile and analyse information that is readily available to police managers and government leaders on a real-time basis in most jurisdictions. Where recommendations involve significant capital costs, the Inspectorate suggested interim measures until such time as money is available for full implementation.

Also, the Inspectorate recognised the current moratorium on recruitment, yet indicated that a strategy should be developed for hiring in the future that will bring the ratio of civilian police staff to sworn members in line with international norms.

In summary, acquiring standard police technologies and better allocating sworn and non-sworn staff will significantly enhance front-line policing in Ireland. Financial constraints may slow progress but a clear roadmap with priorities for the future must be developed. It is the Inspectorate’s hope that this report will provide the basis for that roadmap.

**Kathleen O’Toole**

*Chief Inspector*

# INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW

This report is the product of an inspection of resource allocation in the Garda Síochána carried out by the Garda Síochána Inspectorate at the request of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

The Minister asked for an examination of current Garda resource management systems, an analysis of emergency and non-emergency demands for Garda services and an examination of potential alternative systems that would achieve better matching of Garda resources to workload. The Minister also sought advice on the development and implementation of the Garda Charter proposed in the Programme for Government. The terms of reference for the inspection are at Appendix 1 to this report.

## Resource Allocation – A Universal Issue

Resource allocation is a universal issue in policing. Each year, central and local governments must decide police budgets and determine police staffing numbers. Police leaders must constantly review the distribution of police officers in their jurisdictions.

Down the years, the problem both for governments and police organisations was that they did not have an objective means to quantify the numbers of police officers required to meet community needs. They relied on statistics such as the ratio of police officers to population to help determine overall police numbers. These statistics are, however, poor indicators for setting police resource levels. They are measures of what a community is prepared to spend on law enforcement rather than what police resources it needs.<sup>1</sup>

Counting numbers of recorded offences is not an adequate measure of police workload either. For one thing, police officers do a lot more than just deal with crime. Also, different crimes absorb different levels of police resources.

There is a much more structured approach to measuring workload in the private sector. Construction companies prepare work schedules based on the time required to complete the individual tasks involved in a building project. Factory managers review plant efficiency by measuring the time taken to produce given levels of output. Service companies tender for business by costing the time required to meet client needs. The key factor in all of these scenarios is “time” measurement. The private sector lesson for policing is clear: a police organisation must measure and manage police time if it is to operate with maximum efficiency.

Leading police organisations are now using more sophisticated means to manage police time as an aid to resource allocation. They are using information technology systems to measure the demand for police services and manage the availability of police personnel for duty. They are identifying fluctuations in police workload, by time and place, and matching them with appropriate numbers of police personnel. Their aim is to have the right numbers of police officers in the right places at the right times to meet community needs.

## Key Issues In This Report

Chapters 2 to 5 of this report review the human resources available to the Garda Síochána and current Garda resource allocation systems. Chapter 6 benchmarks international developments in police resource allocation. Chapters 7 and 8 recommend a new approach to resource allocation in the Garda Síochána and content for a Garda charter.

A key issue emerging in the early chapters of the report is that the Garda Síochána does not have systems in place to measure workload. “Time” data from the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system in the Dublin Metropolitan Region (DMR) is incomplete and is not currently used for resource allocation purposes. Outside Dublin, there is no CAD to provide purposeful data on Garda workload and the use of Garda time. Divisional chief superintendents do not know their average response time to citizen calls for service – even

<sup>1</sup> Bellmio P. Calgary Police Service, Patrol Staffing Assessment 2004.

emergency calls. They do not know how many calls are being received, the nature of the calls, or the temporal or geographic spread of calls. Apart from the Command and Control Centre in the DMR, the Garda Síochána currently accepts emergency calls at ninety-four centres countrywide. This is set to reduce to twenty-two next year but, even then, call handling will still be inefficient given the size of the jurisdiction and its population.

In the absence of systems to measure and manage Garda workload and officer availability, the Garda Síochána cannot achieve close matching of Garda resources to demands for police services. The Inspectorate's analysis of sample CAD data from the DMR identified a number of specific examples of mismatching of resources to policing demands. The analysis also revealed significant variations in Garda response capability at different times of day, on different days of the week and between different areas of Dublin City.

There are also serious systems issues in relation to managing human resources. Existing Garda leave, sick leave and overtime systems are disjointed and do not give Garda management the information they need to ensure that resources are deployed to the maximum benefit of the community. Prior to this inspection, Garda management had already identified the need for a modern, networked human resource information system (HRIS). The Inspectorate agrees that this is a pressing need but believes that there is a more immediate requirement for a resource management system (RMS) to manage Garda rostering and attendance. Combined with better CAD data and roster changes, an RMS has far greater potential than HRIS to bring about very significant efficiencies in front-line policing.

## Recommendations

This report makes twenty-seven recommendations aimed at better Garda resource allocation and deployment. They include the following five priority actions:

1. Provide essential new technologies:
  - A national CAD system to manage emergency and non-emergency response to calls for service. The national CAD system should be complemented with (i) a global positioning system (GPS) to identify the location of all on-duty Gardaí for efficiency and safety purposes, and (ii) mapping facilities for rapid identification of crime hotspots and other trends.
  - Software to analyse CAD data so as to predict hourly demands on Garda services and the corresponding numbers of Gardaí required for duty.
  - A resource management system (RMS) to manage rostered time, leave, sick leave, overtime, court attendance, etc. to ensure that the required numbers of Gardaí are available for duty as required.
  - A networked HRIS to hold personal, service, training and expertise/skills data for all sworn and non-sworn personnel.
2. Develop and implement a new Garda policy on telecommunications contacts with members of the public so as to upgrade emergency and non-emergency response. The policy should aim to:
  - Rationalise Garda control rooms such that two national Garda controls rooms staffed by trained civilian call takers and dispatchers would handle all emergency ("999") and non-emergency calls from members of the public countrywide.
  - Bring the new Garda national digital radio system into operation to provide instant, secure and reliable communications between control rooms and all operational Gardaí.
  - Publicise a single Garda Síochána non-emergency telephone number for use by members of the public.
3. Negotiate new attendance rosters for front-line uniformed Gardaí that:
  - Comply with the European Working Time Directive (EWTD).
  - Match the policing needs of the community.
  - Have due regard to the health and safety needs of individual Gardaí.
  - Provide sensible work-life balance for Gardaí.

4. Maximise the numbers of Gardaí available for operational duty through a structured programme of civilianisation, reduction in non-core police duties, redeployment of Gardaí from inefficient station duties to more purposeful outdoor operational duties, and introduction of more efficient work practices, including better organised court attendance.
5. Establish a resource deployment unit with civilian analytical expertise in each Garda region, commencing immediately in the DMR, to achieve close matching of the numbers of on-duty Gardaí to predicted/planned levels of workload. The establishment of the units should be part of a new management and supervision initiative focused on achieving optimum resource allocation.
  - Implementation of these priority recommendations will enable the Garda Síochána to:
  - Provide better and more consistent emergency and non-emergency response.
  - Make more time available for community policing.
  - Make sound strategic resource allocation decisions.
  - Better determine front-line staffing levels.
  - Achieve more even workloads for individual officers.
  - Set measurable performance targets in a Garda Charter.
  - Evaluate regional, divisional, district, station and unit performance.
  - Ensure value for money.

## Acknowledgements

The Inspectorate acknowledges the assistance and support provided to the inspection team in preparing this report. The Inspectorate thanks the personnel at Garda Headquarters, Command and Control in the DMR and the five Garda divisions of Cork City, DMR South Central, DMR Western, Donegal and Laois/Offaly who assisted in data extraction and compilation. The Inspectorate is also grateful to personnel from Mullingar District Headquarters who assisted in defining the Inspectorate's data needs.

The Inspectorate appreciates the assistance provided by police services in the US (Seattle, WA Police Department, the Montgomery County, MD Police Department, and the Metropolitan Police, Washington, DC) and the UK (Central Scotland Police, Gloucestershire Police, Greater Manchester Police, Police Service Northern Ireland, Staffordshire Police, West Midlands Police, West Yorkshire Police and Wiltshire Police) in researching innovative resource allocation systems and providing comparative data.

The Inspectorate is grateful to personnel from the HSE National Ambulance Service, the Dublin Fire Brigade, and the Irish Coastguard Service for their sharing of information and experiences on resource allocation and emergency response.

The Inspectorate thanks Dr. Barry Vaughan, BA (UCD), MA, PhD (Warwick), PGCE, of the Institute of Public Administration for his assistance in compiling published studies relevant to police resource allocation.

# SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

## Chapter 2

### Recommendation 1

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána plan for future recruitment of both police officers and police staff. The plan should aim to bring the ratio of police staff to police officers in line with international norms. It should identify priority areas for civilianisation and the particular skills and expertise required in those areas. Where possible, advantage should be taken of future opportunities to acquire civilian staff with the required skills who may become available through increased mobility across the public service. Future recruitment of police officers should be linked to progress towards achieving an initial minimum target ratio of one member of police staff to every three serving police officers.

### Recommendation 2

The Inspectorate recommends a review of the operation of the Garda Reserve for the purpose of better defining its role taking into account practical experience of its first three years in existence.

### Recommendation 3

The Inspectorate recommends that priority be given in the Garda IT programme to provision of a new human resource information system and a resource management system. Given its potential to bring about greater efficiencies in front-line policing, the resource management system should be developed first.

## Chapter 3

### Recommendation 4

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána pursue opportunities, especially in the DMR, to release sworn personnel from administrative duties at Garda stations through changes in station opening hours and civilianisation.

### Recommendation 5

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána examine means of reducing the volume of administrative transactions at Garda stations. The Garda Síochána should also examine the scope for use of on-line application forms and arrangements to limit the handling of cash.

## Chapter 4

### Recommendation 6

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána adopt, as rapidly as feasible, new rosters and work-hour policies consistent with the European Working Time Directive in order to safeguard the health of members and the safety of both the Garda Síochána and the public.

### Recommendation 7

Leave records, including sick leave records, should be created electronically on a resource management system.

### Recommendation 8

The Inspectorate recommends that Garda Síochána records of sick leave, long-term sick leave and injuries on duty be reviewed, standardised and consolidated across the organisation. Records should be formatted such that local and central managers can quickly discern patterns requiring intervention. Initiatives such as back-to-work interviews should be adopted consistently in all Garda districts supported by a training programme for supervisors and managers.

### Recommendation 9

The Inspectorate recommends an examination of the following factors impacting Garda availability for core police duties:

- Immigration duties.
- Static protection duties.
- Inefficient office technology systems.
- Waiting times in court.

## Chapter 5

### Recommendation 10

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána take immediate steps to improve the quality of computer-aided dispatch data in the Dublin Metropolitan Region and derive maximum benefit from it for resource management purposes.

### Recommendation 11

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána adopt a graduated response to calls for assistance. The Garda Síochána should adopt the widely accepted practice among police services in other jurisdictions of locating a helpdesk in control rooms to enable the needs of some callers to be met over the phone without dispatch of a patrol car.

### Recommendation 12

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána deploy more one-officer mobile units to non-emergency calls in urban areas where back-up is close at hand and use more motorcycles and bicycles for this purpose. One-officer patrols in extensive rural areas should be avoided. If, in exceptional circumstances, such a patrol is so assigned, the Garda concerned should be briefed by a supervisor, guided by an operational protocol, and have designated back-up.

### Recommendation 13

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána develop new managerial and supervisory approaches to resource deployment based on robust and timely data.

## Chapter 7

### Recommendation 14

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Commissioner immediately establish a National Resource Deployment Team to develop a resource allocation plan for the Garda Síochána. Ideally, the team should include sworn personnel, a civilian analyst and a professional project manager experienced in the development of strategic resource allocation in a police environment.

### Recommendation 15

The Inspectorate recommends that the DMR should be the pilot region for implementation of the national resource allocation plan. Experience gained in the pilot should inform roll-out in the other five regions.

### Recommendation 16

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána develop a national computer-aided dispatch system, incorporating GPS facilities, a geo-directory and demand profiling software (DPS).

### Recommendation 17

The Inspectorate recommends that, as a first step in the development of a national computer-aided dispatch system, the Garda Síochána replace the current outdated system in the Dublin Metropolitan Region immediately. The control room manager should report directly to the Assistant Commissioner, DMR.

### Recommendation 18

The Inspectorate recommends that, pending control room rationalisation (see recommendations 20 and 21), the Garda Síochána make a computerised record of the particulars of every “999” call received at the twenty-two divisional control rooms outside the DMR, including the time of the call, dispatch time, arrival time at scene and the call clearance time.

### Recommendation 19

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána devise and publish a policy on telecommunications contacts with members of the public.

### Recommendation 20

The Inspectorate recommends the provision of two mirror-image national Garda control rooms unless it can be conclusively shown that there is an overriding case for a third.

### Recommendation 21

The Inspectorate recommends that the Government have regard to the potential to achieve economies and efficiencies through co-location and integration of the control room systems of the Garda Síochána and other emergency services.

### Recommendation 22

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána establish a resource deployment unit in each Garda region, commencing in the DMR at the earliest possible date. The units would determine the numbers of Gardaí required for duty at any given time based on predicted and planned policing requirements. Each regional resource deployment unit should include personnel with operational policing experience and civilian analyst expertise.

### Recommendation 23

The Inspectorate recommends that one of the first tasks of the DMR Resource Deployment Unit should be the development of incident data recording standards and effective data audit procedures to ensure the completeness and accuracy of computer aided dispatch data. The new standards should require immediate updating of dispatch records by all front-line officers as their operational status (“At Scene” etc.) changes. (Updating should be done by means of voiceless transmissions on the new digital radio system.) Officer safety should be paramount when developing these standards.

### Recommendation 24

The Inspectorate recommends that Garda management and the Garda representative associations begin discussions on new rosters at the earliest opportunity. The new rosters should:

- Be consistent with the terms of the European Working Time Directive as clarified in judgements of the European Court of Justice and accord with evidence-based good practice (see recommendation 6).
- Provide the flexibility to have the right numbers of Gardaí on operational duty to match predicted levels of demand for police services.
- Incorporate recognised health and safety guidelines for shift working.
- Provide sensible work-life balance for Gardaí, giving good notice of work rotas and some weekends free.

## CHAPTER 8

### Recommendation 25

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Charter should set response-time targets for emergency and non-emergency calls. The targets should include dispatch-time targets for control room staff.

### Recommendation 26

The Inspectorate recommends that emergency and non-emergency callers be given an estimated time of arrival of a Garda unit.

### Recommendation 27

The Inspectorate recommends that call takers be trained to identify calls that do not necessitate dispatch of a Garda unit. In those cases, calls should be routed to a Garda helpdesk (see recommendation 11), which can give callers appropriate advice, assistance and/or information.

Chapter  
**01**

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RESEARCH  
METHODS

The terms of reference for this report can be distilled into four key questions:

- What is the current workload of the Garda Síochána?
- How is the Garda Síochána allocating its human resources to meet current workload?
- Are there better ways to allocate Garda human resources to meet policing demands?
- What service-level targets should be included in the proposed Garda Charter?

These are significant questions. They address the fundamentals of daily deployment of thousands of front-line Gardaí. The answers to these questions, together with actions taken in response to them, have the potential to bring about major changes in how the Garda Síochána does its business in serving the community.

The Inspectorate recognised from the outset that examination of human resource allocation in each individual Garda unit would be a monumental task. Accordingly, it was decided to focus on examining the workload and resource management systems of front-line uniformed Garda units, especially the “regular” units providing a mix of response, patrol and other proactive policing.

## Review of Reports

The inspection commenced with a review of relevant reports, published and unpublished, including reports on resource allocation in the Garda Síochána and other police services. The more significant of the reports reviewed are listed at Appendix 2. They provided a wealth of material on measurement of police workload, resource allocation and roster systems.

## Quantitative Data

The most demanding and time-consuming tasks undertaken in the course of the inspection were data collection and analysis for the purpose of assessing current resource allocation in the Garda Síochána.

Data collection was problematic because the Garda Síochána does not have networked information technology systems that routinely collect workload and resource deployment data. During the course of this review, the Inspectorate collected electronic data from (i) PULSE, the incident records management system in the Garda Síochána, (ii) the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system in the Dublin Metropolitan Region (DMR), and (iii) the Garda Regional Integrated Personnel System at Garda Headquarters. This was supplemented by data collected manually from five Garda divisions that reflect the mix of Irish policing environments. Donegal and Laois/Offaly Garda Divisions were selected as being representative of rural policing. The DMR South Central and DMR Western Divisions represented urban and suburban policing respectively. Cork City was chosen to gain insight to policing in a major urban centre outside the DMR. The data collected in these divisions mainly comprised leave, sick leave and overtime statistics in respect of 1,334 Gardaí in front-line uniformed units.

It was decided that, as far as possible, both electronic and manual data would relate to the year 2007 (the latest completed calendar year at the time the inspection began). Where data for 2007 was either not available or too extensive for analytical purposes, it was decided to focus on data for a Garda roster period for which records were readily available. The roster chosen covered the period 11 February to 9 March, 2008. This roster avoided holiday periods and other factors that could skew data analysis.

## Qualitative Data

The Inspectorate gathered qualitative data from senior managers at Garda Headquarters and from members of all ranks and civilian staff in the five Garda divisions visited. During the course of this research the Inspectorate:

- Met with Deputy Commissioner Operations, Chief Superintendent HRM and Superintendent HRM at Garda Headquarters.
- Met with the Assistant Commissioner DMR and received comprehensive briefings from five divisional chief superintendents and nineteen district superintendents.
- Visited nineteen district headquarters and thirty-seven Garda stations, conducting over 200 interviews and focus groups with sworn and non-sworn personnel of every rank and grade.
- Conducted focus groups and interviews with personnel at the Command and Control Centre in Dublin and in five divisional call taking and dispatch centres.
- Met with representatives of the Association of Chief Superintendents, the Association of Garda Superintendents, the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors and the Garda Representative Association.
- Held individual “feedback” meetings with chief superintendents on completion of field work.

## Consultancy Support

To assist in the review of Garda rosters from a physiological perspective, the Inspectorate was pleased to have the authoritative support of Dr. Charles Czeisler, PhD, MD, and FRCP. Dr. Czeisler is the Baldino Professor of Sleep Medicine, Director of the Division of Sleep Medicine at Harvard Medical School and Chief of the Division of Sleep Medicine in the Department of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston, Massachusetts. He is a Diplomat of the American Board of Sleep Medicine, a Fellow of the American Academy of Sleep Medicine and Past-President of the Sleep Research Society.

Dr. Czeisler is recognised internationally as an expert in sleep medicine and shift work and has 35 years of experience in the field of basic and applied research on the physiology of the human circadian

timing system and its relationship to the sleep-wake cycle, resulting in more than 200 published articles in the world scientific and medical literature. He has assisted many organisations in the US, including police departments, in developing new roster systems. He has received the Healthy Sleep Community Award from the U.S. National Sleep Foundation for his research on work schedules among resident physicians; the U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Director’s Award for Scientific Leadership in Occupational Safety and Health; the Lifetime Achievement Award from the US National Sleep Foundation, the Lord Adrian Gold Medal from the UK Royal Society of Medicine (London), the Distinguished Scientist Award from the US Sleep Research Society and an Honorary Fellowship from the UK Royal College of Physicians (London). He served on the Advisory Panel responsible for the report on “Biological Rhythms: Implications for the Worker” by the Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress; the Advisory Committee on Night Operations and Human Chronobiology, Life and Environmental Sciences Division, US Air Force Office of Scientific Research. He was a member of the Drowsy Driving Commission, Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Sleep Disorders Research Advisory Board, US National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.

Dr. Czeisler is/was a member of the Boards of Trustees/Directors of the Institute for Experimental Psychiatry Research Foundation, Sleep Research Society, World Federation of Sleep Research and Sleep Medicine Societies, Association of Professional Sleep Societies, and Sleep Research Society Foundation. For ten years he served as Team Leader of the Human Performance Factors, Sleep and Chronobiology Team of the National Space Biomedical Research Institute of the US National Aeronautics and Space Agency.

Dr. Czeisler met with the Inspectorate and guided the collection of data on the actual working hours of 1,334 Gardaí in five Garda divisions. With the assistance of Mr. Lorcan Walshe, a PhD candidate in the field of Biomedical Engineering Research at Maynooth University, data was subsequently analysed and the findings presented as set out in Chapter 4 of this report.

Chapter  
**02**

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GARDA SÍOCHÁNA  
RESOURCES

The resources of the Garda Síochána are funded by the Irish exchequer. Excluding capital expenditure, the Garda budget is the fourth largest in the Irish public service, representing 3.5% of net current expenditure by Government departments and services.<sup>2</sup>

The most significant resource in the Garda Síochána is the organisation's human resources. Typically, about 70% of the annual Garda budget is required to fund remuneration of police officers and police staff. A further 17% approximately of the budget is allocated to superannuation.

This chapter looks at the human resources available to the Garda Síochána. It addresses current issues around civilianisation, the lack of electronic data to support the human resource management function and the geographic distribution of sworn police officers, including the basis for deciding the distribution. Subsequent chapters will examine demands on Garda services and how the resources outlined here are available to meet them.

## Garda Numbers

Recent Irish governments have committed significant additional resources to the Garda Síochána. The table at Appendix 3 to this report shows that the recorded sworn strength of the Garda Síochána on 1 January, 2009 was 14,412 members (all ranks). This represented an increase of 3,177 members or 28% since 1 January, 1999.<sup>3</sup>

The recent changed economic situation has necessitated the postponement of further Garda recruitment. While this will impact future serving strength, a recruitment pause may alleviate some of the organisational strains that are evident following a period of rapid expansion in personnel numbers. In the course of visits to stations, the Inspectorate noted:

- Additional stresses on busy supervisors assigned responsibility for successive waves of new entrants.

- Reduced scope for in-service training because of the need to dedicate significant training resources to the accelerated recruitment programme.
- Difficulties experienced by Gardaí in accessing PULSE information at busy times, e.g. shift changeovers, because of the limited numbers of terminals available in Garda stations..
- Lack of space for newly-appointed police officers and police staff, including new units of the traffic corps.
- Inadequate facilities for the increased proportion of women joining the Garda Síochána.

In some locations these strains were such that it appeared to the Inspectorate that the quality of Garda services to the public had become over dependent on the goodwill and enthusiasm of front-line Gardaí to "get on with the job." During the current pause in recruitment, the Garda Síochána must address the apparent management, supervision, organisational and technological issues. The Inspectorate believes that a new focus on resource allocation and deployment can lead to a better organised, better managed, better equipped and better deployed police service.

<sup>2</sup> See Table 1A (page 26) of the 2009 Revised Estimates for Public Services accessible at <http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/public%20expenditure/2009/rev2009rev.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> The table at Appendix 3 to this report provide service, age and gender profiles of the Garda Síochána (all ranks).

## Police Staff

The low proportion of police staff in the Garda Síochána was highlighted in the Inspectorate's third report<sup>4</sup> and in the review of the Irish Public Service by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).<sup>5</sup> Over the past ten years, and especially in the past two years, civilian recruitment brought the proportion of police staff in the Garda Síochána up to over 11% of core personnel numbers as of 1 January, 2009. While this represents commendable progress, it has to be seen against international policing benchmarks. Most leading police workforces are now comprised of at least one-third police staff.<sup>6</sup> Some police services have achieved parity in the numbers of police staff and police officers.

The Inspectorate welcomes the Garda Commissioner's commitment to achieve a police staff to police officer ratio of up to 1:3.<sup>7</sup> From a resource allocation perspective, there are important reasons to actively pursue this commitment:

- It is contrary to efficient resource allocation to invest significant time and money in police officers and then assign them in large numbers to work that can be done at least as competently and at lesser cost by non-sworn police staff.
- Civilian subject-matter experts, including experts in HR and resource management, bring much-needed skill sets and experience to policing that allow sworn officers to concentrate on the jobs for which they were recruited and trained.
- A higher proportion of police staff would help to reduce the pressures on front-line Garda units arising from unacceptably high levels of officer turnover. In the Inspectorate's experience, it is not unusual in larger Garda stations for the most senior member of a uniformed unit to have

no more than four years of service, and for the majority to be either still in, or just out of, their two-year probation period. There will always be, and needs to be, officer turnover in front-line units. However, the levels of turnover seen by the Inspectorate are a matter of concern and are contrary to the interests of the community, the organisation and front-line officers themselves.

- The training programme for new entrants to the Garda Síochána is the longest among comparable police services and absorbs considerable resources. Recruitment of police staff to replace serving Gardaí in posts that do not require police skills or powers is a quicker, most resource-efficient and more cost-effective means of increasing the operational Garda presence in the community.

The prevailing Government budgetary position precludes hiring of significant numbers of new personnel to the Garda Síochána. However, the Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána plan for future recruitment of both police officers and police staff. The plan should aim to bring the ratio of police staff to police officers in line with international norms. It should identify priority areas for civilianisation and the particular skills and expertise required in those areas. Where possible, advantage should be taken of future opportunities to acquire civilian staff with the required skills who may become available through increased mobility across the public service.<sup>8</sup> Future recruitment of police officers should be linked to progress towards achieving an initial minimum target ratio of one member of police staff to every three serving police officers.

## Garda Reserve

Garda Síochána resources have been augmented since December, 2006 by a part-time Garda Reserve. There are currently 410 reservists with a further 154<sup>9</sup> in training. The Inspectorate met with members of the Reserve during the course of the inspection and was impressed by their enthusiasm and commitment.

4 Policing in Ireland – Looking Forward, accessible at <http://www.gsinsp.ie>

5 Page 29 of OECD review IRELAND, Towards an Integrated Public Service accessible at [http://www.bettergov.ie/attached\\_files/upload/IRELAND-Towards%20An%20Integrated%20Public%20Service.pdf](http://www.bettergov.ie/attached_files/upload/IRELAND-Towards%20An%20Integrated%20Public%20Service.pdf)

6 Page 18 of Policing in Ireland – Looking Forward,, accessible at <http://www.gsinsp.ie>

7 Report of the Commissioner's appearance before the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights on 27 January, 2009 as accessed on 31 March, 2009 at <http://debates.oireachtas.ie/DDebate.aspx?F=JUJ20090127.xml&Page=1&Ex=224#N224>

8 Transforming Public Services, Stationery Office, Dublin, 2008, pages 27-29.

9 Figures provided by the Garda Síochána as at 30 June, 2009

Garda management must ensure that the resources of the Garda Reserve are used appropriately and to the benefit of the community. A crucial consideration is that the role of the Reserve must be clearly defined and its members must receive direction and training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities.

The Inspectorate recommends a review of the operation of the Garda Reserve for the purpose of better defining its role taking into account practical experience of its first three years in existence.

## Human Resource Information System (HRIS)

The Garda Síochána does not have a modern human resource information system (HRIS). This results in a multitude of information gaps. For instance, the Inspectorate had hoped to analyse how Garda human resources are allocated by function. This would have facilitated international benchmarking of the numbers of Garda personnel, sworn and non-sworn, assigned to police management, operations, administration and technical functions. Unfortunately, the Inspectorate could not proceed with the analysis because the necessary data was not readily available from the Garda Síochána and would have been costly to compile.

The absence of a modern Garda HRIS means that there is no single electronic repository of all Garda human resource records. A basic personnel record is held on a computer at Garda Headquarters for each sworn member. This system is accessible at Garda Headquarters only. Other human resource records for sworn members are held locally in Garda districts. Accordingly, there is no means of quickly compiling organisation-wide human resource data. For instance, Garda management does not have ready access to complete data on members' experience and expertise such as their:

Assignments (other than the locations to which members have been assigned).

- Academic qualifications.
- Training courses attended.
- Specialist skills.
- Languages skills

The problem is compounded by the fact that many local records are not computerised and are not maintained in a standardised format. In some cases, there are no consolidated records, e.g. at many stations the only available record of a member's annual leave is the leave sheet.

The richer the HR information available to Garda management, the better will be the quality of their resource allocation decisions. Garda management is well aware of the need to put in place a new, modern HRIS and has evaluated options in that regard. The Inspectorate agrees that there is a pressing need for a HRIS but believes that there is a more immediate requirement for a resource management system (RMS), as recommended in Chapter 7, to manage Garda rostering and attendance. Combined with better CAD data and roster changes, an RMS has far greater potential than HRIS to bring about very significant efficiencies in front-line policing.

## Geographic Allocation of Gardaí

Under the Garda Síochána Act 2005, the Garda Commissioner determines the allocation of police officers to headquarters, national units and the operational Garda divisions in the State. Garda management has indicated that among the main factors taken into account in allocating sworn personnel are crime levels, demographic changes, and factors relevant to the security of the state.

The table at Appendix 5 to this report shows comparative geographic distributions of serving Garda numbers in 1999, 2004 and 2009. It is clear from the table that all Garda divisions benefited from the programme of accelerated Garda recruitment over the past ten years. The divisions that benefited most were the Western, Northern and Southern Divisions of the DMR and the Limerick Division.

Of the net extra 3,177 members recruited in the ten years to 1 January 2009, 21% were assigned to the Traffic Corps as part of the successful programme of measures to reduce road deaths and injuries. Increases in traffic corps numbers accounted for significantly greater proportions of the additional police officers allocated to rural divisions since 1999 than was the case with urban divisions.

## GERM

In 1999, the Garda Síochána developed a computer-based model known as the Garda Establishment Redistribution Model (GERM) to guide decisions on the allocation of operational police officers. Other police services have also developed models of this kind.

GERM was designed to quantify the mainstream workloads of Garda divisions and calculate the amounts of Garda time required to meet those workloads. The model appears to have been built on a sound theoretical base suited to its purpose as a “pragmatic” guide to decision-making. To be fully effective, GERM would have required regular updating as new workload and demographic data became available. Absence of up-to-date data on the use of police time, which was initially collected by means of an activity survey in Garda districts, has been a problem for a number of years. In its absence, it would appear that Garda management has relied more on subjective assessment of policing needs based on professional experience than on objective workload measurements.

Garda Síochána managers need the support of good quality workload data in deciding resource allocations into the future. A fully updated GERM is still relevant (the Garda Síochána is committed to reviewing it in 2009). However, the Inspectorate believes that there is a need to supplement it with more in-depth analysis of workload at Garda district level. Later chapters of this report will illuminate this need.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 1

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána plan for future recruitment of both police officers and police staff. The plan should aim to bring the ratio of police staff to police officers in line with international norms. It should identify priority areas for civilianisation and the particular skills and expertise required in those areas. Where possible, advantage should be taken of future opportunities to acquire civilian staff with the required skills who may become available through increased mobility across the public service. Future recruitment of police officers should be linked to progress towards achieving an initial minimum target ratio of one member of police staff to every three serving police officers.

### Recommendation 2

The Inspectorate recommends a review of the operation of the Garda Reserve for the purpose of better defining its role taking into account practical experience of its first three years in existence.

### Recommendation 3

The Inspectorate recommends that priority be given in the Garda IT programme to provision of a new Garda HRIS and RMS. Given its potential to bring about greater efficiencies in front-line policing, the RMS should be developed first.

Chapter  
**03**

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DEMAND FOR  
GARDA SERVICES

In any business, and policing is no exception, measuring workload is essential to efficient and effective resource allocation. Unless an organisation knows how much work it has to do, it cannot begin to determine the resources needed to get it done most efficiently.

Police services must have good quality information on the demands being made on them in order to determine how best to allocate their human and other resources. This chapter analyses the demands being made on the Garda Síochána based on available data. Using calls-for-service data from the DMR and Cork City, it highlights hourly and daily variations in the levels of demand for emergency and non-emergency police response. This chapter also looks at the demand for administrative services at Garda stations and the scope for greater efficiencies.

## Garda Síochána Functions

The statutory functions of the Garda Síochána, as set out in Section 7 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005, provide an overview of the different demands made on the organisation. These functions require the Garda Síochána to “provide policing and security services for the State with the objective of:

- a) preserving peace and public order,
- b) protecting life and property,
- c) vindicating the human rights of each individual,
- d) protecting the security of the State,
- e) preventing crime,
- f) bringing criminals to justice, including by detecting and investigating crime, and
- g) regulating and controlling road traffic and improving road safety.”

Section 7 also provides that members of the Garda Síochána have “such functions as are conferred on them by law including those relating to immigration.”

Behind this list of formal functions is an extensive range of service demands that are made on front-line police officers. Indeed, the range is very extensive and diverse. For instance, in addition to dealing with crime and enforcing traffic laws, Gardaí assist in a whole variety of tasks related to mountain rescues, wandering animals, hospital escorts, family disputes, runaway children and emergency births. The range of demands made on police officers is best captured in the observation that people summon

police assistance when they encounter “something that ought not to be happening and about which someone had better do something now.”<sup>10</sup>

The challenge for Garda managers with responsibility for resource allocation is to quantify how much of their officers’ time is taken up by all of these different demands.

## Difficulties in Measuring Demand for Garda Services

This report focuses on the service demands of front-line uniformed Gardaí. They are the police officers who respond to all kinds of emergency and non-emergency calls from members of the public. They engage in proactive police work such as crime prevention patrols, crime investigation and community policing. They prepare crime files and penalty notices and attend court to give evidence.

Unfortunately, the Inspectorate was unable to quantify all of the demands being made on these officers for a number of reasons:

- The Garda Síochána does not have systems in place to routinely collect and analyse workload data for individual units across the organisation.
- There is no dedicated Garda team or individual responsible for monitoring workload and advising Garda management on deployment.

<sup>10</sup> Bittner, E. (1974), Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A theory of the police, in Jacob H. (ed.), *The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice*, Beverley Hills: Sage.

- PULSE, the Garda Síochána incident management system, does not capture – nor was it intended to capture – information on the amount of time Gardaí spend dealing with incidents.
- The Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system in the DMR is the richest available source of information on service demands (emergency and non-emergency) made on front-line Gardaí. However, this system covers the Dublin area only and, even then, not all incident-related data is collected.
- Outside Dublin, calls for service are not recorded electronically. Apart from the Cork City Garda Division, where a limited amount of data on calls for service is recorded, the available manual records are at best incomplete.
- Deployment records maintained at Garda stations provide information on the shifts and overtime worked by Gardaí, but not the nature of the duties on which they were engaged.
- Data from consultancy reports prepared for the Garda Síochána (see Appendix 2) and PULSE data to assess demand for administrative services provided to the public at Garda stations.

## Pulse Data as an Indicator of Relative Workload

PULSE is networked to a total of 347 Garda Síochána locations and holds information on criminal and non-criminal incidents, including traffic incidents, attended by members of the Garda Síochána.

Figure A shows all primary incidents recorded on PULSE in 2007, categorised by Garda division. It will be seen that some divisions, notably divisions in the DMR and Cork City Division, recorded significantly higher numbers of incidents. This indicates that demand for Garda services is not evenly distributed between Garda divisions and that some divisions have a substantially greater workload than others. These workload differences need to be measured on an ongoing basis for resource allocation purposes using CAD technology.

## CAD Data for The DMR

In 2007, the DMR recorded a total of 436,449 calls for service from members of the public on its CAD system<sup>12</sup>. This amounts to an average of 1,196 calls per day (an average of three per hour per DMR Garda district). The calls were received by phone and recorded on a CAD screen either at the Command and Control Centre at Harcourt Street or at a Garda station in the DMR.

Analysis of the 2007 CAD data from the DMR reveals two prominent daily variations in the volume of calls received:

## Analysis of Demand-Related Data

For the purpose of achieving some measurement of demand for police services, the Inspectorate reviewed the limited demand-related data that is available from the Garda Síochána. The Inspectorate reviewed:

- PULSE data, by Garda division, to get a broad indication of relative workload at divisional level.
- CAD data from the DMR and manual dispatch data from Cork City Garda Division to quantify the workload associated with calls for service from members of the public, determine the nature of those calls in the DMR (emergency and non-emergency), and identify the times of relatively high and low call loads.<sup>11</sup>
- The average daily peak in call volumes in each of the six divisions of the DMR occurred in the late evening between 20.00 and 22.00 hours.
- DMR divisional call loads were lowest between 05.00 and 07.00 hours.

Both of these findings are consistent with data collected in respect of 97, 137 incidents recorded in the Dublin area in January and December of 1997.<sup>13</sup>


<sup>11</sup> The Inspectorate had hoped to analyse 2008 sample data from Donegal and Laois/Offaly Garda Divisions. Analysis did not proceed, however, when it became apparent that a number of Garda district headquarters had not recorded all calls for service during the sample period.

<sup>12</sup> A further 32,644 calls were received from Gardaí who reported incidents.

<sup>13</sup> Proposed Framework for Rostering in the Garda Síochána, Garda Headquarters, 20th May, 1998, page 12

FIGURE A:

Numbers of Primary Incidents Recorded on PULSE in 2007 by Garda Division<sup>14</sup>




Analysis also shows both geographic and temporal variations in demand for Garda services. It is apparent from Figure B that call volumes are not evenly spread between the six divisions in the Region. The DMR Western Division had by far the greatest call load of the six divisions at all times of the day and night and the highest peak in demand between 20.00 and 21.00 hours.

noteworthy exceptions. For instance, the numbers of calls for service in the DMR South Central Division remained relatively stable between 18.00 and 23.00 hours whereas there is a distinct peaking in call loads during these hours in other divisions. Also, the numbers of calls increased sharply in the DMR South Central Division between midnight and 01.00 whereas call numbers in the other five divisions fell during that hour.

While call patterns are broadly similar for all six divisions over the twenty-four hours, there are some

FIGURE B:

Numbers of Calls for Service, by Hour of Day, in the Six Garda Divisions of the DMR in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008<sup>15</sup>



14 While the divisional comparisons in Figure A are useful, they should not, for the reasons already mentioned, be regarded as measures of Garda workload at divisional level. The best sources of police workload data are properly managed CAD systems.

15 Note that each “weekday” in the chart begins at 4 a.m. For instance, the CAD incident count for “Monday” begins at 4 a.m. on Monday and finishes at 4 a.m. on Tuesday.

FIGURE C:

**CAD Calls for Service, by Weekday, in the Six Garda Divisions of the DMR  
in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008<sup>16</sup>**




Figure C shows that call loads in the six divisions of the DMR vary from one weekday to another. The busiest days are Friday and Saturday. It is also important to note that demand is just as significant on Sundays as it is on other days of the week. (Note: Early and late Garda shifts work at half strength on Sundays under the current Garda three-relief roster.)

### Emergency Response

The Inspectorate was asked specifically to analyse demand for emergency Garda response.

Calls for service in the DMR are categorised by four priority types in the CAD system: Emergency, Category 1, Category 2, and Category 3. Table 1 shows the numbers and proportion of calls in each category in 2007.

Emergency and Category 1 calls merit the greatest speed of response. Between them, these categories accounted for 53,559 calls, or 12% of all calls for assistance, in 2007. This amounted to an average of 147 calls per day or roughly one call per hour per DMR Garda division.

TABLE 1:

**Numbers of Recorded Calls for Service, by Category,<sup>17</sup> in the DMR in 2007**


	Emergency	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Totals
Numbers of Recorded Incidents	2,756 (0.63%)	50,803 (11.64%)	260,938 (59.79%)	121,952 (27.94%)	436,449 (100%)
Average daily numbers of Recorded Incidents	8	139	715	334	1,196

<sup>16</sup> DMR CAD data for the roster period include 6,753 incident records that are not categorised by Garda Division. These records are included in Figure C. They are distributed between the six divisions in proportion to their relative categorised call loads. Note that each “weekday” in the chart begins at 4 a.m. For instance, the CAD incident count for “Monday” begins at 4 a.m. on Monday and finishes at 4 a.m. on Tuesday.

<sup>17</sup> Emergency and Category 1 calls merit immediate response. Emergency calls include incidents where there is a danger to life. Category 1 calls include incidents where a serious crime is in progress or just occurred. Category 2 and Category 3 calls are given a lower priority. Category 2 calls may, for instance, include notification of an offence committed at a much earlier time. Category 3 calls relate to minor incidents/offences.

FIGURE D:

### Numbers of Calls for Service by Hour of the Day and by Weekday in the Cork City Garda Division in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008<sup>18</sup>



## Manual Dispatch Data for Cork City Garda Division

The Inspectorate analysed a sample of 3,664 calls for service recorded manually in the Cork City Garda Division during the roster period, 11 February to 9 March, 2008. This volume of recorded calls is comparable to that of the DMR North Central Division. The majority of the calls were received via the “999” system.

Figure D suggests that, as in the DMR, there are varying levels of demand for operational Garda services in Cork City by time of day and by weekday. It would appear that demand levels increase steadily during each day, peaking between 8 p.m. and 3 a.m. The highest peaks occur on Friday and Saturday nights. It is not possible to indicate how many “emergency” calls were received in the Cork City Division during the period because call records are not categorised by dispatch priority.

## Demand for Administrative Services at Garda Stations

The Garda Síochána provides administrative services to the public at Garda stations countrywide. The administrative services provided in 2007 included:

- Certification of identity for (i) passport applicants (estimated at more than 500,000 in 2007) and (ii) persons opening bank accounts.
- Examination of road traffic documents that drivers were required to produce (235,144 in 2007).
- Acceptance of annual firearms licence fees (233,120 licences issued/renewed in 2007/2008).
- Provision of a sign-on facility for persons on bail or temporary release from prison.
- Certification of motor tax forms.
- Acceptance of incident reports.
- Processing of applications for age cards.

Administrative services are available to the public on a twenty-four hour basis at larger stations (mainly divisional and district headquarters). Other stations have official opening times during the morning, afternoon and evening. In general, small rural stations have daily official opening hours from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. The official opening hours of rural one-officer stations vary from one to three hours on five to seven days per week.

The Inspectorate estimates that as many as 1,650 Gardaí are required each day to provide administrative services to the public at Garda stations. This represents over 14% of all members of Sergeant and Garda rank assigned to Garda divisions and is a very high proportion by

<sup>18</sup> Note that each “weekday” in the chart begins at 4 a.m. For instance, the CAD incident count for “Monday” begins at 4 a.m. on Monday and finishes at 4 a.m. on Tuesday.

international standards.<sup>19</sup> Having so many sworn officers engaged in providing administrative services – something that is done by police staff in other jurisdictions—does not make best use of resources.

The Inspectorate is convinced that there is immediate scope to redeploy Gardaí from station to outdoor operational duty, especially in larger urban centres, without impacting significantly on provision of administrative services to the public. The aim should be to provide administrative services at the times when the vast majority of members of the public already avail of them. A 2002 consultancy report<sup>20</sup> prepared for the Garda Síochána found that *“between 80 and 90 per cent of customers called to a Garda station during regular office hours, that most callers required a Garda signature (for passport, licences, etc.)”*<sup>21</sup> and that *very few callers arrived during the night.”*

The 2002 consultancy report estimated that revised opening hours of stations in the DMR, where forty-two of the forty-seven stations are open twenty-four hours a day, would free up 240 personnel at Sergeant and Garda rank for more visible policing in the community and increased supervision of Garda resources. The savings would be even more significant if administrative services for the public were provided by trained civilian police staff and members of the Garda Reserve. The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána pursue opportunities, especially in the DMR, to release sworn personnel from administrative duties at Garda stations through changes in station opening hours and civilianisation.

The Inspectorate also recommends that the Garda Síochána examine means of reducing the volume of administrative transactions at Garda stations. For instance, the majority of callers to Garda stations

attend to have a passport signed. The Inspectorate estimates that large stations in Dublin certify the identity of eighty passport applicants per week and small rural stations an average of seven per week. The need for such certification should be reviewed. In the case of adults renewing their passport, consideration should be given as to whether the old passport is a sufficient certificate of identity.

The Garda Síochána should also examine the scope for use of on-line application forms and arrangements to limit the handling of cash. This would reduce the administrative burden on all stations and leave more time for operational duties.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 4

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána pursue opportunities, especially in the DMR, to release sworn personnel from administrative duties at Garda stations through changes in station opening hours and civilianisation.

### Recommendation 5

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána examine means of reducing the volume of administrative transactions at Garda stations. The Garda Síochána should also examine the scope for use of on-line application forms and arrangements to limit the handling of cash.

<sup>19</sup> For instance, Greater Manchester Police, which serves a population of 2.6 million people, has thirteen 24-hour stations as compared with forty-two such stations in the DMR, which has a population of one million people.

<sup>20</sup> The Garda Síochána, Review of Organisation Structures and Service Delivery, Final Report: July 02. (The recommendations of this report were published in Garda SMI Implementation Steering Group, Final Report, February 2004, Stationery Office, Dublin.)

<sup>21</sup> The report’s findings on the purposes for which people called to Garda stations are set out at Appendix 6 to this report. The findings are supported by similar findings from a local Garda survey of callers to Blanchardstown Garda station in 2006 – see Appendix 7.

Chapter  
**04**

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GARDA HUMAN  
RESOURCE  
AVAILABILITY

Factors such as guns, gangs, drugs, public order, and road traffic fatalities created a strong demand in recent years for an increased Garda presence in the community. This demand was met more by accelerated recruitment to the Garda Síochána than through initiatives aimed at maximising efficiency in the use of existing Garda resources. The net result is that the Garda Síochána is now benefiting from the additional resources that have come on stream but significant additional benefits remain possible within current staffing levels.

This chapter examines the current availability of human resources in the Garda Síochána from the following important perspectives:

- Rosters.
- Factors limiting the number of Gardaí available for duty, e.g., leave schemes and sick leave.
- Use of overtime to increase the availability of Gardaí for duty.
- Factors affecting on-duty Gardaí in the discharge of core police work, i.e., non-police duties, inefficient systems and processes, waiting times in courts and training time.

## Garda Síochána Rosters

Uniformed Gardaí assigned to “regular” units in the DMR and in Cork, Limerick and Waterford cities work a “three relief” roster. This comprises three shifts each day as follows:

- 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. (Early)
- 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. (Late)
- 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. (Night)

Members of these units work twenty shifts in a twenty-eight day roster period; seven nights, seven late shifts and six early shifts. This allows an average of two rest days per week.

There are four “regular” Garda units (A, B, C and D) in each Garda division with a similar number of members attached to each of them. Where members work round-the-clock, three units are assigned to work on any given day and one is rested. An exception arises on Sundays, when units work at half strength on the early and late shifts. This allows each member two Sundays off per roster.

The “three-relief” roster in the DMR is unchanged since the early 1970s. The equivalent roster in Cork, Limerick and Waterford cities was revised in 2002. The revision included an arrangement whereby a

district superintendent can determine the numbers of Gardaí required for the standard early, late and night shifts. Any remaining Gardaí can be required to work from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. or from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m.

Outside of the DMR and Cork, Limerick and Waterford cities, there are two long established “country” rosters. One is designed for members attached to units that provide a twenty-four hour service. This is broadly similar to the three-relief rosters in the cities. The other “country” roster is designed for members assigned to small rural stations that do not operate on a 24/7 basis.

In 1982, two “flexi” shifts (10 a.m. to 6 p.m. and 6 p.m. to 2 a.m.) were authorised to boost the numbers of Gardaí on duty in urban areas during the busier periods of the day. However, these shifts have had limited impact on staffing because:

- Many districts have not used them.
- In the districts where they have been used, relatively low numbers of Gardaí have been assigned to them.

The current Garda rosters are not serving the best interests of the community, the Garda Síochána or its members. There are three compelling reasons for urgent action to replace them:

- Legal developments.
- The need for greater flexibility in deployment.
- The health and well-being of individual Gardaí.

**Legal Developments**

The European “Working Time Directive”<sup>22</sup> (EWTD) was transposed into Irish law by means of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Section 3 of the Act provides that its provisions shall not apply to members of the Garda Síochána, other than by order made by the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, after consultation with the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. In recent years, however, judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities have declared that armed forces, the police and other civil protection services only have a limited exemption from the EWTD. According to the Court, the exemption only applies to activities during exceptional circumstances, such as catastrophes.<sup>23</sup>

The EWTD includes provision for:

- A daily rest break of eleven consecutive hours.
- A weekly rest break of a minimum of twenty-four uninterrupted hours.


- A maximum average working period of forty-eight hours per week, including overtime. (The average is normally measured over a period of four months.)

In the current DMR roster, there are four occasions when members are allowed a break of only eight hours between shifts. There is no twenty-four hour rest break in the DMR during the week of seven consecutive night shifts. In the three Garda rosters operated outside the DMR, there are four to six rest breaks of only eight hours.

The Inspectorate analysed the working hours and rest breaks of 1,334 Gardaí in the roster period 11 February to 9 March, 2008 in the five Garda divisions visited during the inspection. The Inspectorate found that during this period the members concerned accumulated a total of 5,536 breaks of less than eleven hours between shifts (23.5% of all inter-shift breaks in the period). A total of 1,732 of these breaks (7.3 % of the total) were of less than eight hours duration (see Figure F). Outside of major emergency situations this practice should simply not occur.

**FIGURE F:**

**Analysis of Breaks Between Shifts Afforded to the Sample of 1,334 Gardaí in Five Garda Divisions in the Period 11 February to 9 March, 2008**



22 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November, 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time

23 Judgments in cases C-132/04 and C-52/04 accessible at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu>

**FIGURE G:**

**Analysis of Shift Lengths Worked (including Overtime) by 1,334 Gardaí in Five Garda Divisions in the Period 11 February to 9 March, 2008**





Figure G shows that the sample of 1,334 Gardaí worked 560 shifts (2.22%) in excess of sixteen hours in length. Twelve of these Gardaí each worked a shift in excess of twenty-four hours. The longest shift worked amounted to thirty-three hours. While the incidence of excessively long periods of duty is relatively small, they involve serious implications for health, safety and effective performance of duty. Such excessive hours should not be worked outside of major emergency situations.

The EWTD requires that the average time worked in each seven-day period, including overtime, must not exceed forty-eight hours. (The average is normally measured over a period of four months.) Examination of hours worked by the sample of 1,334 Gardaí indicated that 189 or 14.2% of them worked in excess of an average 48 hours per week over the four-week roster from 11 February to 9 March, 2008 (see Figure H). Notwithstanding significant reductions in the interim in the levels of Garda overtime being authorised, it is still possible for an individual Garda to work in excess of an average of forty-eight hours per week.

**FIGURE H:**

**Average Weekly Hours Worked by 1,334 Gardaí in Five Garda Divisions in the Period 11 February to 9 March, 2008**



### Flexibility

The current rosters for “regular” units in the DMR, Cork, Limerick, Waterford and other urban centres are overly rigid. They result in roughly equal numbers of Gardaí being available for duty on each shift, regardless of fluctuations in the level of demand for police services. The Inspectorate has seen some evidence of district superintendents in Cork exercising the option of having Gardaí work non-standard hours during the early and night shifts,<sup>24</sup> but there would appear to be much greater potential to use this option to have more Gardaí on duty at the busier times of the day. (The next chapter looks in detail at matching the supply of Gardaí to levels of demand for police services.) Even where Garda management has advance notice of major sporting and cultural events, e.g. All-Ireland and international sports fixtures at Croke Park, significant levels of overtime are incurred because there is no provision to vary the duty start times of an individual Garda assigned to a “regular” unit in the DMR to meet particular policing needs.

### Health and Well-Being of Members

At the invitation of the Inspectorate, Dr. Charles Czeisler<sup>25</sup> reviewed the Garda rosters from the perspective of the health and well-being of the Gardaí who work them. He concluded that there are a number of features of the current rosters in need of change. These are:

#### Inadequate Breaks Between Shifts

A break of eight hours or less between shifts is inadequate as it does not permit Gardaí to obtain a sufficient amount of sleep between shifts. As the US National Transportation Safety Board has noted, rest time between shifts should provide the opportunity to obtain at least eight continuous hours of sleep, and should “consider time needed for travel, eating, personal hygiene, recreation, or inability to fall asleep immediately at the beginning of the off-duty period.”<sup>26</sup> Whenever the scheduled interval between shifts is only eight hours in duration, then routine daily activities, such as commuting

home from work, meals (e.g., breakfast, lunch, dinner or snacks), social interactions with family or friends, entertainment (television, internet), relaxation/winding down, daily hygiene (shower, bathing, etc.), preparation for work, and commuting from home back to work must all occur at the expense of obtaining an adequate amount of time for sleep. This is why the European Working Time Directive (EWTD) requires that every worker be provided with a minimum daily rest period of eleven consecutive hours per twenty-four hour period.

In contrast, the current DMR roster, for example, has four quick changeovers that provide only an eight-hour interval between shifts in its twenty-eight day roster. As illustrated in Figure E, data on actual working hours from five Garda Divisions reveal that:

- One in four intervals between shifts (~410,000 annually, extrapolated system-wide) is less than eleven hours in duration.
- One in twenty intervals between shifts (~90,000 annually, extrapolated system-wide) is four to seven hours in duration.
- One in fifty intervals between shifts (~40,000 annually, extrapolated system-wide) is one to three hours in duration.

As noted elsewhere, insufficient sleep has been demonstrated to have detrimental effects on alertness, vigilance, psychomotor skills and mood.<sup>27 28 29 30 31 32</sup> The ability to sustain attention, maintain cognitive performance and prevent attention failures deteriorates when sleep is chronically restricted to seven or

24 Superintendents may require some members to commence work at 7 a.m. instead of 6 a.m., and at 8 p.m. instead of 10 p.m.

25 See page 13 of this report.

26 National Transportation Safety Board, Factors that affect fatigue in heavy truck accidents, Volume 1: Analysis. NTSB/SS-95/01, 1995, Washington, D.C.

27 Czeisler CA. The Gordon Wilson Lecture: Work hours, sleep and patient safety in residency training. *Trans Am Clin Climatol Assoc* 2006; 117:159-189.

28 Durmer JS, Dinges DF. Neurocognitive consequences of sleep deprivation. *Semin Neurol* 2005; 25:117-129.

29 Van Dongen HPA, Maislin G, Mullington JM, Dinges DF. The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: Dose-response effects on neurobehavioral functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation. *Sleep* 2003; 26:117-126.

30 Belenky G, Wesensten NJ, Thorne DR, Thomas ML, Sing HC, Redmond DP et al. Patterns of performance degradation and restoration during sleep restriction and subsequent recovery: A sleep dose-response study. *J Sleep Res* 2003; 12:1-12.

31 Czeisler CA. Quantifying consequences of chronic sleep restriction. *Sleep* 2003; 26:247-248.

32 Van Dongen HPA, Dinges DF. Sleep debt and cumulative excess wakefulness. *Sleep* 2003; 26:249.

fewer hours per night for a week or longer.<sup>33 34</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Stress, tiredness, irritability, distractibility and the frequency of complaints increase, while sociability and optimism decrease in the face of chronic sleep loss, which significantly increases psychometric measures of total mood disturbance and impairs judgment. <sup>36</sup>

<sup>37 38 39 40</sup> Objective measures of performance, including reaction time and memory, worsen with each successive day that insufficient sleep is obtained, with the degree of impairment directly dependent on the number of hours of sleep lost.<sup>41 42</sup> Chronic sleep restriction, such as losing two hours of sleep per night, impairs reaction time and driving performance by an amount equivalent to that induced by alcohol ingestion.<sup>43 44</sup> Moreover, inter-individual differences in the vulnerability to sleep loss, including those resulting from sleep disorders and other medical disorders, such as scheduling

practices, place a disproportionate health and safety burden on those most vulnerable to sleep loss.<sup>45</sup> Based upon this evidence, Garda shifts should be scheduled with an adequate interval between shifts that allows sufficient time for sleep, other than in cases of emergency.

### Absence of a Policy Limiting Consecutive Work Hours

Extrapolation of the shift duration data shown in Figure G system-wide suggests that in the order of ~40,000 Garda shifts annually were greater than sixteen hours in duration, with nearly a thousand Garda shifts annually greater than twenty-four hours (and up to thirty-three hours) in duration. During sustained wakefulness, twenty-four hours of sleep deprivation has been shown to impair neurobehavioral performance to an extent that is comparable to a level of 0.10 percent blood alcohol content.<sup>46 47 48 49 50</sup> Even a single episode of moderate sleep deprivation, such as staying awake for seventeen to nineteen hours without sleep, degrades neurobehavioral performance to a level that is equivalent or worse than that induced by a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05%, slowing response speeds by up to 50% and significantly degrading accuracy. <sup>51</sup> Paradoxically, instead of slowing down to preserve accuracy as reaction time increases, sleep deprivation often leads people to make hasty decisions based on inadequate information. <sup>52</sup> Sleep fragmentation also impairs next-day functioning. The effects of sleep loss result in increased rates of errors on selective attention tasks that require a search for targets

33 Institute of Medicine. Sleep disorders and sleep deprivation: An unmet public health problem. Colten HR, Altevogt BM, editors. ISBN:0-309-66012-2, 1-500. 2006. Washington, D.C., National Academies Press.

34 Van Dongen HPA, Maislin G, Mullington JM, Dinges DF. The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: Dose-response effects on neurobehavioral functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation. *Sleep* 2003; 26:117-126.

35 Belenky G, Wesensten NJ, Thorne DR, Thomas ML, Sing HC, Redmond DP et al. Patterns of performance degradation and restoration during sleep restriction and subsequent recovery: A sleep dose-response study. *J Sleep Res* 2003; 12:1-12.

36 Dinges DF, Pack F, Williams K, Gillen KA, Powell JW, Ott GE et al. Cumulative sleepiness, mood disturbance, and psychomotor vigilance performance decrements during a week of sleep restricted to 4-5 hours per night. *Sleep* 1997; 20:267-277.

37 Haack M, Mullington JM. Sustained sleep restriction reduces emotional and physical well-being. *Pain* 2005; 119:56-64.

38 Killgore WD, Balkin TJ, Wesensten NJ. Impaired decision making following 49 hours of sleep deprivation. *J Sleep Res* 2006; 15:7-13.

39 Killgore WD, Killgore DB, Day LM, Li C, Kamimori GH, Balkin TJ. The effects of 53 hours of sleep deprivation on moral judgment. *Sleep* 2007; 30:345-352.

40 Anderson C, Horne JA. Sleepiness enhances distraction during a monotonous task. *Sleep* 2006; 29:573-576.

41 Van Dongen HPA, Maislin G, Mullington JM, Dinges DF. The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: Dose-response effects on neurobehavioral functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation. *Sleep* 2003; 26:117-126.

42 Belenky G, Wesensten NJ, Thorne DR, Thomas ML, Sing HC, Redmond DP et al. Patterns of performance degradation and restoration during sleep restriction and subsequent recovery: A sleep dose-response study. *J Sleep Res* 2003; 12:1-12.

43 Powell NB, Schechtman KB, Riley RW, Li K, Troell R, Guilleminault C. The road to danger: the comparative risks of driving while sleepy. *Laryngoscope* 2001; 111:887-893.

44 Roehrs T, Burduvali E, Bonahoom A, Drake C, Roth T. Ethanol and sleep loss: a "dose" comparison of impairing effects. *Sleep* 2003; 26:981-985.

45 Czeisler CA. Medical and Genetic Differences in the Adverse Impact of Sleep Loss on Performance: Ethical Considerations for the Medical Profession. *Trans Am Clin Climatol Assoc* 2009; *in press*

46 Dawson D, Reid K. Fatigue, alcohol and performance impairment. *Nature* 1997; 388:235.

47 Falletti MG, Maruff P, Collie A, Darby DG, McStephen M. Qualitative similarities in cognitive impairment associated with 24 h of sustained wakefulness and a blood alcohol concentration of 0.05%. *J Sleep Res* 2003; 12:265-274.

48 Powell NB, Schechtman KB, Riley RW, Li K, Troell R, Guilleminault C. The road to danger: the comparative risks of driving while sleepy. *Laryngoscope* 2001; 111:887-893.

49 Lamond N, Dawson D. Quantifying the performance impairment associated with fatigue. *J Sleep Res* 1999; 8:255-262.

50 Williamson AM, Feyer AM. Moderate sleep deprivation produces impairments in cognitive and motor performance equivalent to legally prescribed levels of alcohol intoxication. *Occup Environ Med* 2000; 57:649-655.

51 Ibid.

52 Horowitz TS, Cade BE, Wolfe JM, Czeisler CA. Searching night and day: a dissociation of effects of circadian phase and time awake on visual selective attention and vigilance. *Psychol Sci* 2003; 14(6):549-557.

in the visual field. In fact, the duration of time it takes to react to a visual stimulus (simple reaction time) averages three times longer after twenty-four hours of wakefulness than beforehand.<sup>53</sup> Extended durations of wakefulness also increase the risk of attention failures—in which the eyes begin rolling around in their sockets at the transition from wakefulness to sleep—and of involuntary transitions from wakefulness to sleep, despite efforts to remain awake.

Analysis of more than 100,000 job records encompassing about 90,000 person-years of accumulated working time in the US, together with a formal meta-analysis of published research studies in the international world literature, have revealed that the relative risk of injury or accident is more than doubled after twelve hours of work.<sup>54</sup> Rogers and her colleagues found that the risk of error was three times higher when nurses worked shifts of 12.5 hours or longer.<sup>55</sup> Rates of motor vehicle crashes in young physicians scheduled to work for greater than twenty-four consecutive hours were 168% higher during the commute home from work than from shifts that afforded them an opportunity to obtain consolidated sleep averaging seven to nine hours in duration.<sup>57</sup> When performing procedures during the daytime, these young physicians had a seventy-three percent increased risk of stabbing themselves with a needle or scalpel after working for more than twenty consecutive hours.<sup>58</sup> They also made 36% more serious medical errors, including 460% more serious diagnostic mistakes, when they worked shifts that were greater than twenty-four hours in duration, as compared to scheduled shift durations that were limited to

sixteen consecutive hours.<sup>59</sup> Due to the adverse effects of such extended duration work shifts on the safety of both the Gardaí and the public, it is critical that the Garda Síochána develops policies that prohibit this dangerous practice outside of major emergencies.<sup>60</sup> Shifts (including overtime) should be limited to a maximum of approximately thirteen consecutive hours, as effectively required by the EWTD, given the requirement of eleven consecutive hours of rest time per twenty hours.<sup>61</sup> Shifts that include night work should not exceed eight hours in duration, including overtime, as stipulated in the EWTD.<sup>62</sup>

### Requirement to Work Seven Consecutive Night Shifts

The requirement to work the night shift on seven consecutive nights in each four-week cycle is contrary to best practice shift work arrangements because it leads to the build up of chronic sleep deprivation, with its attendant adverse effects on health and safety. Since the light-dark cycle is the most powerful synchronizer of human circadian rhythms,<sup>63</sup> the circadian rhythms of most people do not readily adapt to working at night and sleeping during the day.<sup>64</sup> Therefore, most people lose about two hours of sleep or more each night that they work. This leads to the accumulation of chronic sleep debt, which is associated with significant deterioration

53 Cajochen C, Khalsa SBS, Wyatt JK, Czeisler CA, Dijk DJ. EEG and ocular correlates of circadian melatonin phase and human performance decrements during sleep loss. *Am J Physiol* 1999; 277:R640-R649

54 Folkard S, Lombardi DA. Modeling the impact of the components of long work hours on injuries and "accidents." *Am J Ind Med* 2006; 49:953-963.

55 Dembe AE, Erickson JB, Delbos RC, Banks SM. The impact of overtime and long work hours on occupational injuries and illnesses: new evidence from the United States. *Occup Environ Med* 2005;62:588-597.

56 Rogers AE, Hwang WT, Scott LD, Aiken LH, Dinges DF. The working hours of hospital staff nurses and patient safety. *Health Aff (Millwood)* 2004; 23:202-212.

57 Barger LK, Cade BE, Ayas NT, Cronin JW, Rosner B, Speizer FE et al. Extended work shifts and the risk of motor vehicle crashes among interns. *N Engl J Med* 2005; 352:125-134.

58 Ayas NT, Barger LK, Cade BE, Hashimoto DM, Rosner B, Cronin JW et al. Extended work duration and the risk of self-reported percutaneous injuries in interns. *JAMA* 2006; 296(9):1055-1062.

59 Landrigan CP, Rothschild JM, Cronin JW, Kaushal R, Burdick E, Katz JT et al. Effect of reducing interns' work hours on serious medical errors in intensive care units. *N Engl J Med* 2004; 351(18):1838-1848.

60 Czeisler CA. Sleep Deficit. The Performance Killer. Fryer B, editor. *Harvard Business Review* 84[10], 53-59. 2006.

61 EWTD: "Daily rest: Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period."

62 EWTD: "Length of night work: Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that: (a) normal hours of work for night workers do not exceed an average of eight hours in any 24-hour period; (b) night workers whose work involves special hazards or heavy physical or mental strain do not work more than eight hours in any period of 24 hours during which they perform night work."

63 Czeisler CA, Gooley JJ. Sleep and circadian rhythms in humans. *Cold Spring Harb Symp Quant Biol* 2007; 72:579-597.

64 Czeisler CA, Buxton OM, Khalsa SBS. The human circadian timing system and sleep-wake regulation. In: Kryger MH, Roth T, Dement WC, editors. *Principles and Practices of Sleep Medicine*. Philadelphia: W.B.Saunders Company, 2005: 375-394.

65 Czeisler CA, Johnson MP, Duffy JF, Brown EN, Ronda JM, Kronauer RE. Exposure to bright light and darkness to treat physiologic maladaptation to night work. *N Engl J Med* 1990; 322:1253-1259.

in alertness and performance.<sup>66 67</sup> Occupational safety studies have revealed that the risk of occupational injuries and accidents increases significantly with the number of consecutive night shifts worked.<sup>68 69</sup> For this reason, the U.S. Institute of Medicine has recommended that night shifts should be limited to no more than four consecutive nights.<sup>70</sup> Seven consecutive nights of work is contrary to best practice.

#### Starting Time of the Early Shift (6 a.m. to 2 p.m.)

Factoring in commute time and a morning meal, many Gardaí will need to awaken between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. in order to report for duty by 6 a.m. In order to get eight hours of sleep, this would require many to go to bed at approximately 8 p.m., which is near the peak of the circadian wake propensity rhythm, a time of day when it is most difficult to initiate sleep.<sup>71</sup> A later shift start time would align better with the physiological sleep propensity rhythm and reduce the tendency of Gardaí to be sleep deprived when working the day shift. This should result in better performance and alertness levels on the day shift and a reduced risk of sleep-related errors and accidents.

In the course of the Inspectorate's visits to stations, many Gardaí voiced concerns about the current Garda rosters, especially in relation to short (eight hour) changeovers. While fewer Gardaí were critical of the requirement to work seven consecutive night shifts, it was

apparent from the data that many of them availed of annual leave (or time off in lieu of overtime) during these shifts. It would appear that this may well be a strategy to cope with the physiological demands of seven consecutive night shifts.

#### Direction of Shift Rotation

Currently, after Gardaí have been working the late shift (2 p.m. to 10 p.m.), which usually results in most workers going to bed after midnight, they must make the transition to working the early shift (6 a.m. to 2 p.m.), which requires them to awaken between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m. Since the intrinsic period of the human circadian pacemaker is longer than twenty-four hours,<sup>72</sup> it is easier to make the transition from late shift to night shift (akin to the shift required for Westward air travel), rather than making the transition from early shift to night shift (akin to the shift required for Eastward air travel). More than twenty-five years ago, this was shown to increase both worker satisfaction and productivity significantly.<sup>73</sup>

#### Frequency of Shift Changes

Currently, Gardaí are often scheduled to make the transition between early and late shifts twice as frequently as necessary. Each time that they make the transition from working the late shift, which ends at 10 p.m., to the early shift, which begins at 6 a.m., there is only an eight-hour interval between shifts. While this should not happen at all, it should certainly not happen twice within a five-day interval, as it currently does. Increasing the duration of time on steady shifts has been shown to improve both employee satisfaction and productivity.<sup>74</sup>

In light of the foregoing, the Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána adopt, as rapidly as feasible, new rosters and work-hour

66 Van Dongen HPA, Maislin G, Mullington JM, Dinges DF. The cumulative cost of additional wakefulness: Dose-response effects on neurobehavioral functions and sleep physiology from chronic sleep restriction and total sleep deprivation. *Sleep* 2003; 26:117-126.

67 Belenky G, Wesensten NJ, Thorne DR, Thomas ML, Sing HC, Redmond DP et al. Patterns of performance degradation and restoration during sleep restriction and subsequent recovery: A sleep dose-response study. *J Sleep Res* 2003; 12:1-12.

68 Folkard S, Lombardi DA. Modeling the impact of the components of long work hours on injuries and "accidents". *Am J Ind Med* 2006; 49:953-963.

69 Dembe AE, Erickson JB, Delbos RG, Banks SM. The impact of overtime and long work hours on occupational injuries and illnesses: new evidence from the United States. *Occup Environ Med* 2005;62:588-597.

70 Institute of Medicine of the National Academies. *Resident Duty Hours: Enhancing Sleep, Supervision, and Safety*. Ulmer C, Wolman DM, Johns MME, editors. 1-322. 2008. Washington, D.C., The National Academies Press.

71 Czeisler CA, Buxton OM, Khalsa SBS. The human circadian timing system and sleep-wake regulation. In: Kryger MH, Roth T, Dement WC, editors. *Principles and Practices of Sleep Medicine*. Philadelphia: W.B.Saunders Company, 2005: 375-394.

72 Czeisler CA, Duffy JF, Shanahan TL, Brown EN, Mitchell JF, Rimmer DW et al. Stability, precision, and near-24-hour period of the human circadian pacemaker. *Science* 1999; 284:2177-2181.

73 Czeisler CA, Moore-Ede MC, Coleman RM. Rotating shift work schedules that disrupt sleep are improved by applying circadian principles. *Science* 1982; 217:460-463.

74 Ibid.

policies consistent with the EWTD in order to safeguard the health of members and the safety of both the Garda Síochána and the public:

- Limitation on the duration of Garda shifts to no more than thirteen consecutive hours, including overtime, except in emergency circumstances.
- Limitation on the duration of Garda shifts that include night work to no more than eight hours in any twenty-four hour period, except in emergency circumstances.
- Limitation on the weekly work hours of Gardaí to no more than forty-eight hours, including overtime, except in emergency circumstances.
- Provision of a minimum of eleven consecutive hours of rest in every twenty-four hour period, except in emergency circumstances.
- Provision of a minimum of thirty-six consecutive hours of rest every week, except in emergency circumstances.
- Limitation to no more than four consecutive night shifts, except in emergency circumstances.
- Commencement of the early shift no earlier than 7 a.m.
- If shift rotation is involved, reduction in the frequency of shift rotations.
- If shift rotation is involved, progression of shift changes from early shift to late shift to night shift, followed by at least two recovery days off, whenever possible, before the transition back to early shift.

## Factors Impacting on the Number of Gardaí Available for Duty

### Leave Schemes

In addition to annual leave, the Garda Síochána operates a further fourteen leave schemes, including Term Time<sup>75</sup> and Special Leave, which are specifically mentioned in the terms of reference for this inspection. Five of the fourteen schemes are statutory schemes common to all employments in the state. The other nine schemes operate across the public service and in larger private sector employments.

The Inspectorate wished to carry out a full assessment of the impact of these schemes on the availability of Gardaí for duty in 2007. This was not practicable, however, because almost all of the relevant Garda records are paper-based and are not consolidated. Also, six of the fourteen leave schemes are administered locally in Garda districts and compilation of data would have involved an organisation-wide review of leave files held by individual Gardaí. In the circumstances, the Inspectorate decided to limit its analysis to:

- Data from Garda Headquarters on the numbers of members of the Garda Síochána who availed of the eight centrally-authorized leave schemes in 2007. From these numbers, the Inspectorate calculated the maximum impact of the eight schemes on Garda availability for duty on the assumption that each member availed of their full entitlement (See Appendix 8).
- Data on the numbers of leave days taken under the six locally-authorized Garda leave schemes. For the most part, the data was collected in the five Garda divisions visited in the course of this inspection. This data was used to estimate the organisation-wide impacts of the leave schemes in question (See Appendix 9).

Both sets of data are brought together in Table 2. It will be seen that the estimated maximum countrywide impact of all fourteen leave schemes on Garda availability for duty in 2007 amounted to a loss of 2.5% of total Garda workdays in that year. This equates to a maximum loss of 337<sup>76</sup> full-time Gardaí.

At first glance, this appears a significant “loss” to the Garda Síochána. However, closer examination reveals that 82% of the “loss” (the equivalent of 277 full-time gardaí), is accounted for by statutory leave schemes, which are a factor of all employments in the State, and unpaid schemes (job sharing, career breaks, term time and special leave without pay). The impact of the remaining leave schemes (the equivalent of 60 full-time gardaí) could be more than offset by a reduction in sick leave (see page 36) and a revision of opening hours at Garda stations (page 25).

<sup>75</sup> This scheme was superseded on 30 April, 2009 by the Shorter Working Year Scheme (Department of Finance Circular E109/27/09).

<sup>76</sup> Based on a Garda working an average of 227 days per annum calculated as follows: 365 days less 104 rest days = 261; less 34 days annual leave = 227 days.

There are indications, however, that the operation of leave schemes may be having a disproportionate impact in urban Garda districts. For instance, the fourteen leave schemes accounted for a loss of 2,750 workdays in one Garda district in the DMR in 2007. This was the equivalent of losing twelve full-time Gardaí or 14.4% of total Garda numbers in the district concerned. Accordingly, Garda

management needs to have ready access to accurate information on the take-up of leave schemes at local level to be able to determine their impact on the numbers of Gardaí available for duty. This can best be achieved through development of an effective resource management system (see Chapter 7 of this report).

**TABLE 2:**

**Estimated Maximum Countrywide Impact of Garda Síochána Leave Schemes on Garda Attendance in 2007**

Leave Scheme (S) = Statutory Scheme	Maximum* Number of Leave Days Taken Expressed as a Percentage of Total Garda Workdays	Maximum* Number of Leave Days Taken Expressed as the Equivalent Number of Full-time Gardaí
1 Parental Leave (S)	0.470	64.76
2 Job sharing	0.420	57.50
3 Career Break	0.310	42.00
4 Maternity Leave (Without pay) (S)	0.213	29.25
5 Term Time	0.050	6.87
6 Special Leave w/o Pay	0.010	1.41
7 Adoptive leave (S)	0.002	0.31
8 Special Leave with Pay	0.001	0.12
9 Maternity Leave (with pay)** (S)	0.527	72.48
10 Study/Examination Leave**	0.215	29.57
11 Representative Body Leave**	0.192	26.43
12 Paternity Leave**	0.026	3.58
13 Force Majeur** (S)	0.017	2.34
14 Transfer Leave**	0.005	0.69
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2.458</b>	<b>337.31</b>

\* In the absence of more detailed information, it is assumed that members who availed of the leave schemes listed at rows 1 to 8 took the full entitlement of leave days available – see calculations at Appendix 8.

\*\* The figures in rows 9 to 14 are estimates of the take-up of the leave schemes in question in the Garda Síochána as a whole based on sample data from the five Garda divisions visited in the course of the inspection – see Appendix 9.

### Sick Leave

The Garda Síochána recorded the loss of an average of ten working shifts per member due to sick leave, including long-term sick leave and injuries on duty, in 2007. An average of 2.25 shifts per member was lost through long-term sick leave.<sup>77</sup> An average of 1.5 shifts per member was lost through injuries on duty.

The table at Appendix 10 shows a breakdown, by Garda division, of working shifts lost through sickness, long-term sickness and injuries on duty in 2007. It will be seen that these three leave types accounted for losses in divisions averaging from 3.7 to 15.5 shifts per member. Sixteen of the twenty-five Garda divisions recorded losses in excess of the national average of ten shifts per member.

While Garda management has taken initiatives to reduce sick leave in recent years, it would appear that there is scope for further reductions. Benchmarked against sick leave in other police organisations, an average loss of ten shifts per officer per annum is not in line with best practice. For instance, police services in the UK have achieved sick leave levels as low as seven days per officer per annum.<sup>78</sup> The average loss per officer through sick leave in police services in England and Wales in 2007/08 was 8.4 days.<sup>79</sup>

The benefits of lower sick absence levels are significant. Based on Garda Síochána sworn numbers as of 1 January, 2009, a reduction in average sick leave of one shift per member would increase Garda availability for duty by 14,158 shifts per annum. This is the equivalent of adding sixty-five<sup>80</sup> experienced Gardaí at no extra cost. Achieving a sick leave average of seven shifts per member would be the equivalent of having an additional 195 full-time Gardaí available for duty – a sizeable number at a time when there is a pause in recruitment.

<sup>77</sup> Garda records of long-term sick leave exclude absences arising from injuries incurred while off duty.

<sup>78</sup> Data from ten British police services indicate that six of them had averages of less than eight days sick leave per sworn member in 2007/08. Only one of the ten police services had an average of greater than ten sick days. Some of the ten British police services, including the service that recorded an average of seven days sick leave per member, count absences on rest days in their sick leave statistics.

<sup>79</sup> Per UK Home Office

<sup>80</sup> Calculated on the basis of a Garda working 218 days per annum (365 days minus 104 rest days, 34 days annual leave (including public holidays) and nine sick days).

The first step towards reducing sick leave is to put better information in the hands of managers and supervisors. Sick leave is recorded in the station diary, sergeant's diary, Form D5, Form A.85 (which is primarily an overtime record), and Forms S2, S3 and S4. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the time and cost of completing these various records/returns, none of them provides management with good quality information on sick leave trends.

At the same time, the Inspectorate was impressed by the efforts that some district superintendents were making to improve the incidence of sick leave among their officers. Several superintendents cited positive experience with back to work interviews, which involve the superintendent meeting with officers on their resumption of duty following sick leave. There appeared to be a lack of consistency, however, between districts in this initiative and in other aspects of management of sick leave.

The Inspectorate recommends that Garda Síochána records of sick leave, long-term sick leave and injuries on duty be reviewed, standardised and consolidated across the organisation. Sick leave records should be created electronically on a resource management system (see Chapter 7). Records should be formatted such that local and central managers can quickly discern patterns requiring intervention. Initiatives such as back-to-work interviews should be adopted consistently in all Garda districts supported by a training programme for supervisors and managers.


### Use of Overtime to Increase the Availability of Gardaí for Duty

A total of 3,014,618 overtime hours were worked by members of the Garda Síochána (Garda, Sergeant and Inspector ranks) in 2007. This was equivalent to adding 1,737 further Gardaí to the organisation, a boost of 13% on the serving strength as of 1 January, 2007.

Figure I shows that crime investigation (19.2%) and court attendance (18.5%) were the two largest categories of overtime usage in 2007, followed by crime prevention (8.5%). (Figures for the second half of 2008 indicate a similar apportionment, even though overtime working had reduced significantly as compared with 2007.)

FIGURE I:

Garda Síochána Overtime in 2007 by Purpose



A breakdown of Garda overtime hours worked in 2007 is at Appendix 11 to this report. Almost 80% of all overtime hours were worked in Garda divisions, the six divisions of the DMR accounting for 38% of total overtime hours.

While the 2009 overtime budget of €80m is down on previous years, it still represents a very significant resource that should be used strategically to provide as much surge capacity as possible to meet front-line policing demands. Having analysed overtime worked in 2007 in the five divisions visited in the course of this inspection, the Inspectorate is satisfied that there is scope for more strategic use of the overtime budget. For instance, the Inspectorate sees room for a reallocation of overtime currently spent on court attendance. While some court attendance on overtime is unavoidable, better scheduling should allow for a greater proportion of court attendance on ordinary time. (As discussed later in this chapter there is scope to reduce the amount of ordinary duty time that Gardaí spend in court waiting for their cases to be called.)

Earlier in this chapter (Figure H, page 29), it was seen that some of the sample of 1,334 Gardaí worked an average of more than 57 hours per week in the roster period 11 February to 9 March, 2008. In fact, the Inspectorate has seen instances in which individual Gardaí worked more overtime hours in the roster than they did rostered hours. One garda actually worked 201 hours overtime in the twenty-eight days and had only two days off.

Other gardaí were found to have worked for up to 33 hours without a break. Such practices are hazardous from an occupational safety perspective and raise serious efficiency, effectiveness and civil liability issues for management. In the US, overtime workers have been shown to have a 61% higher injury hazard rate compared to workers in jobs without overtime, after controlling for age, gender, occupation, industry, and region.<sup>81</sup> Weekly overtime should be limited to conform to the weekly work hour limits of the EWTD,<sup>82</sup> as should the maximal number of consecutive hours of work (effectively limited to thirteen consecutive hours per shift by the requirement of eleven consecutive hours of rest time per twenty-four hours).<sup>83</sup> Shifts that include night work should not exceed eight hours in duration, including overtime, as stipulated in the EWTD.<sup>84</sup>

81 Dembe AE, Erickson JB, Delbos RG, Banks SM. The impact of overtime and long work hours on occupational injuries and illnesses: new evidence from the United States. *Occup Environ Med* 2005;62:588–597.

82 EWTD: “Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that, in keeping with the need to protect the safety and health of workers the average working time for each seven-day period, including overtime, does not exceed 48 hours”

83 EWTD: “Daily rest: Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period.”

84 EWTD: “Length of night work: Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that: (a) normal hours of work for night workers do not exceed an average of eight hours in any 24-hour period; (b) night workers whose work involves special hazards or heavy physical or mental strain do not work more than eight hours in any period of 24 hours during which they perform night work.”

## Factors Affecting On-Duty Gardaí in the Discharge of Core Police Duties

### *Non-Core Police Duties*

Sworn members of “regular” Garda units carry out duties that lie outside what would be regarded as core police functions. The range of these duties has been reduced gradually over many years and further reductions are ongoing. For instance, the Inspectorate welcomes the current initiatives at an advanced stage to relieve the Garda Síochána of the work of collecting firearms licence fees and executing debtors’ warrants.<sup>85</sup>

While progress is being made, the non-police duties that are still carried out by “regular” uniformed Garda units continue to represent a significant draw on Garda numbers and time. The nature of these duties is such that they do not require the exercise of the powers of sworn police officers. In difficult economic times it is more important than ever to note that these duties can be carried out efficiently and effectively at much less cost to the taxpayer by properly qualified non-sworn personnel.

Two non-core police duties – immigration controls and protection posts – absorb significant numbers of Gardaí (and overtime hours) on a full-time basis. The Inspectorate sees value in continuing Garda involvement in both of these areas but believes that, in the interest of greater efficiency and cost effectiveness, sworn officers should be deployed only in situations in which their particular training, expertise and powers are required.

The Inspectorate sees potential for greater civilianisation in three areas of immigration controls: registration and granting of permission to remain, back office administration duties and immigration controls at ports and airports. The registration process in Cork, Dublin and Limerick cities is already being done by trained, non sworn personnel overseen by sworn officers. As well as achieving greater cost effectiveness, this has freed up Gardaí at those locations for core policing duties in the community. The Inspectorate believes that there is further scope to rationalise and civilianise

routine registration and administration work in all Garda divisions and that this should be examined without delay.

Traditionally, immigration control functions at all ports of entry into the State have been performed by members of the Garda Síochána equipped with the necessary investigative training, skills and experience. This must continue in the interest of effective immigration controls and maintaining the security of the state. At the same time, however, there may be possibilities for civilians with specialised training to undertake some limited passport control functions with the support and direction of sworn officers. This is something that merits closer study by the Garda Síochána and the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service.

The Inspectorate acknowledges the progress made by the Garda management in discussions with the Garda representative bodies in the context of “Towards 2016” on the outsourcing of protection posts at Garda Headquarters. There is a need to accelerate this progress and review full-time protection posts at other Garda locations—DMR Headquarters and the Garda College.

There is also a need to look again at full-time Garda protection posts at non-Garda locations. When visiting the DMR South Central and Western Garda Divisions, the Inspectorate noted that well in excess of one hundred Gardaí are required to fill full-time protection posts in these Divisions. In addition, some 18% and 11% respectively of the 2007 overtime budgets of these divisions were spent on protection. (Protection post duty, which is unpopular among the majority of Gardaí, has traditionally required overtime and travel/subsistence payments as standard.)

It is not appropriate to comment in this report on security arrangements for specific locations. However, it would be remiss of the Inspectorate not to recommend an examination by the relevant authorities, including the Garda Síochána, of the possibility of replacing at least some Gardaí at these locations with non-sworn security personnel. The new non-sworn personnel would work in close cooperation with the Garda Síochána.

<sup>85</sup> There are approximately 233,120 licensed firearms in the State. The Garda Síochána handles over 4,500 debtors’ warrants annually.

Front-line Gardaí perform other non-police duties on a part-time basis which take from the time available for core police work. The Inspectorate has already highlighted the inefficiencies involved in Garda escorting of remand prisoners<sup>86</sup>. There is also a need to identify measures to reduce the impact on Garda time of other escorts, i.e. transport of young absconders from Garda stations to care facilities operated by the HSE<sup>87</sup> and involuntary committals to psychiatric hospitals.

Another matter which impacts on front-line operational Garda time is the use of patrol cars to transport internal Garda mail as well as warrants and charge sheets for court appearances. These tasks need to be streamlined immediately and carried out by non-sworn personnel. The provision of email facilities (see below) to Garda offices would increase the timeliness, efficiency and security of written communications.

### *Office Systems*

The Inspectorate was seriously concerned about inefficient use of Garda time arising from lack of modern electronic office systems in many Garda stations visited.

The Inspectorate heard anecdotal evidence from Gardaí of inadequate computer access for preparation of crime files. This was supported by first-hand visits to public offices and detective rooms which had minimal computer facilities. In some locations Gardaí make up for the lack of official computer facilities by preparing files on their personal laptops and home computers. This practice is not only unacceptable but results in an inordinate amount of official time being spent copying material to standalone computers in Garda stations. It also:

- Impedes the development of well-structured, time-saving electronic document repositories in Garda stations.

- Puts Garda computers at high risk of infection from computer viruses from home computers. (Computers in Garda stations are typically standalone personal computers without internet access for updating of virus protection software. In the Inspectorate's experience it is exceptional for Garda stations up to and including divisional headquarters to have networked word processing facilities and electronic document libraries).
- Creates conditions for a security/confidentiality breach because so much information is held on mobile storage media such as disks and memory sticks that are in circulation outside stations.

The Inspectorate has already reported on the absence of email in Garda stations.<sup>88</sup> Extraordinary amounts of Garda time are being wasted in hardcopy preparation, filing and photocopying because email is not available. The advent of the Garda Síochána Information Portal, which will make Garda information available to all PULSE-networked locations, will represent a significant improvement. It will not, however, obviate the need for a much more comprehensive Garda email system than is currently available. Recent efficiency guidelines from the Department of Finance recognised email as the preferred means of communication in the public service. Garda stations have yet to acquire the necessary technology to that end.

### *Waiting Time in Court*

Giving evidence in court is a core duty of a police officer. There is considerable concern, however, about the amount of time that Gardaí spend waiting in court for their case(s) to be called. This time would be spent more productively on duty in the community.

The Garda Síochána does not measure the amount of rostered time that Gardaí spend in court. However, in 2007, some 536,865 hours of Garda overtime alone was incurred in court attendance at a total cost of €24.9m. This number of hours equates to 309 full-time Gardaí.

<sup>86</sup> Third report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Policing in Ireland – Looking Forward 2007, accessible at [http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com\\_docman&Itemid=39](http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=39)

<sup>87</sup> Fifth report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Missing Persons, Review and Recommendations 2009, page 21, accessible at [http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com\\_docman&Itemid=39](http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=39)

<sup>88</sup> Third Report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Policing in Ireland – Looking Forward 2007, accessible at [http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com\\_docman&Itemid=39](http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=39)

The Inspectorate has previously expressed concern about the amount of time Gardaí spend in court.<sup>89</sup> The nub of the issue is that Gardaí are required to attend court at court commencement time (10.30 a.m. in the District Court) even though some of them are unlikely to be called to give evidence until the afternoon. A more efficient approach could be achieved by mainstreaming the arrangements already operating in “traffic” courts whereby a Garda is requested to attend at one of a number of court times (10.30 a.m., 11 a.m., 11.30 a.m., 2 p.m., 2.30 p.m. and 3 p.m.) on each sitting day.

The Inspectorate believes that Garda attendance at court should be examined by a group comprising representatives of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, the Courts Service and the Garda Síochána with a view to achieving greater efficiency in the use of Garda time. The Inspectorate also believes that, for health and safety reasons, every effort should be made to avoid scheduling Gardaí to appear in court when they are working a sequence of night shifts.

The Garda Síochána should collect and analyse data on the number of on-duty hours that Gardaí spend in court and identify specific strategies to bring about a reduction. This is particularly important at the present time given that overtime is restricted and Gardaí are required to attend court as far as possible during their rostered hours.

### *Training Time*

The Garda Inspectorate is a strong advocate for continuing professional development in the Garda Síochána. In 2007, members of the Garda Síochána spent a total of 504,793 hours in training, the equivalent of 2% of total Garda working hours (excluding overtime) in that year.

From a resource allocation perspective, the challenge for the Garda Síochána is, as far as possible, to schedule training outside of the times of the day, week and year when there is high demand for Garda services. A capacity to analyse Garda workload at district level together with the development/implementation of new work rosters should identify more efficient windows for in-

service training. With an eye to cost efficiency, there is a need to ensure that as much training as possible is carried out locally in Garda divisions and on-line.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 6

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána adopt, as rapidly as feasible, new rosters and work-hour policies consistent with the EWTD in order to safeguard the health of members and the safety of both the Garda Síochána and the public.

### Recommendation 7

Leave records, including sick leave records, should be created electronically on a resource management system.

### Recommendation 8

The Inspectorate recommends that Garda Síochána records of sick leave, long-term sick leave and injuries on duty be reviewed, standardised and consolidated across the organisation. Records should be formatted such that local and central managers can quickly discern patterns requiring intervention. Initiatives such as back-to-work interviews should be adopted consistently in all Garda districts supported by a training programme for supervisors and managers.

### Recommendation 9

The Inspectorate recommends an examination of the following factors impacting Garda availability for core police duties:

- Immigration duties.
- Static protection duties.
- Inefficient office technology systems.
- Waiting times in court.

<sup>89</sup> Third report of the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, Policing in Ireland – Looking Forward 2007, accessible at [http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com\\_docman&Itemid=39](http://www.gsinsp.ie/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=39)

Chapter  
**05**

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MATCHING THE  
SUPPLY OF GARDA  
HUMAN RESOURCES  
TO LEVELS OF  
DEMAND FOR  
GARDA SERVICES

Every organisation, whether in the public or private sector, aims to have appropriate staffing levels at all times to conduct its business efficiently and effectively. If too few employees are working when large numbers of customers are demanding services, the result is poor business performance. Likewise, having too many employees working at less busy times is inefficient and wasteful. Getting it right requires constant monitoring of business levels and matching appropriate staffing levels to them.

This chapter analyses the scope for better matching of Garda staffing levels to workload. It looks at the numbers of recorded calls for service in the DMR and the numbers of Garda vehicles available to respond to them.<sup>90</sup> It provides examples of mismatching of demand and resource levels and highlights the importance of data analysis in having the right numbers of personnel on duty at all times. The chapter also highlights the importance of management and supervision in resource allocation and deployment.

## Garda Resource Levels and Demand for Services

Garda management is sensitive to changes in policing needs in Garda divisions. The numbers of sworn members assigned to Garda divisions are continually changing in light of emerging needs and circumstances. Where necessary, Garda management deploys overtime and specialist units to boost the level of Garda activity in any given area. As a unitary national police service, the Garda Síochána is capable of redeploying substantial numbers of police officers to meet particular needs that arise across the State, e.g. the protests at Ballinaboy, Co Mayo.

What is less evident in the Garda Síochána is routine matching of the numbers of uniformed Gardaí on duty to anticipated levels of policing demand. The Inspectorate found that the absence of CAD technology in Garda divisions outside the DMR was a significant barrier to compiling timely and effective information for the purpose of demand/resource matching. Without a CAD system, rural Garda divisions have no working data on the numbers of emergencies or other calls for service attended or the average time taken to respond to


calls. This leaves Garda managers without the objective data they need to measure demand and match Garda numbers to it.

Within the DMR, where a CAD system is in operation, there did not appear to be full appreciation of the value of CAD data as an aid to determining levels of demand for police services. This may be due in part to data gaps in critical elements of dispatch records. For instance, data on “at scene” times is incomplete<sup>91</sup> making it impossible to establish how much time Garda units spend responding to calls. While, some management information is taken from the CAD system, it is not analysed to the extent required to unlock its value as an aid to efficient and effective resource allocation. The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána take immediate steps to improve the quality of DMR CAD data and derive maximum benefit from it for resource management purposes.

<sup>90</sup> Garda vehicles respond to the vast majority of calls for assistance. The vehicles listed as being available to the DMR control room do not represent the totality of Garda vehicles operating at any given time.

<sup>91</sup> An “At Scene” time was not recorded for 164,177 (37.6%) of the total of 436,449 DMR CAD records for 2007. By comparison, during a reported twelve month period, an “At Scene” time was not recorded in only 32 out of 222,134 CAD records of a Canadian police service.

**FIGURE J:**  
**Average Daily Numbers of Calls for Service and Garda Mobile Crews Available to Command and Control<sup>92</sup> in the DMR by Hour of Day in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008**



### Matching Numbers of Available Garda Response Units to Policing Demands

The Inspectorate analysed a sample of data from the CAD system in the DMR for the four-week roster period from 11 February to 9 March, 2008. The data included:

- Recorded hourly numbers of calls for service received from members of the public.
- Recorded numbers of Garda vehicles logged-on to the CAD system for all or part of each hour.

Figure J shows that, overall, there were more than enough Garda vehicles available in the Region to service calls for assistance from the public. In fact, Figure J (supported by PULSE data) suggests that there were more vehicles available in the Region than were needed between midnight and 8a.m. Some of those vehicle crews might have been better deployed during the busier evening period, especially from 8p.m. to 10 p.m. when call numbers actually exceeded the numbers of mobile crews available to Command and Control. The Garda Síochána SMI Review Group noted as far back as 1998<sup>93</sup> that “having the same number of Gardaí working the regular system over the twenty-four hour period results in a mismatch between personnel availability and public demand

for policing services.” (Having more Gardaí than necessary working in the latter half of the night is not only costly in terms of wages, it is also costly in terms of the health, well being and safety of the Gardaí, since those work hours are the most disruptive to the circadian timing system and the sleep-wake cycle, and pose the greatest safety risk to Gardaí.)

Figures K and L look more closely at underlying data for two of the six Garda divisions in the DMR during the twenty-eight days in question. They highlight an imbalance in call-handling capability between divisions.

It will be seen from Figure K that the average number of Garda vehicles logged-on in “Division X” during each hour of the day exceeded the average number of calls for service received. Figure L shows a different situation in “Division Y.” In that Division, the average number of available Garda vehicles was less than the average number of calls received during two periods, i.e. 17.00 to 18.00 and from 19.00 to 22.00. This suggests that there was a greater risk of a calls backlog in the late evening in “Division Y” as compared with “Division X.”


Figures M and N show how call-handling capability can vary within the same Garda division on different days of the week. It will be seen that the division in question had similar call-load patterns on the profiled Tuesdays and Saturdays (Figure N) during these hours because fewer Garda mobile units were available.

92 This chart and Charts K, L, M and N do not include traffic corps, detective, and specialist vehicles.

93 SMI Review Group, Proposed Framework for Rostering in the Garda Síochána, Garda Headquarters, 20th May 1998, page 5


**FIGURE K:**

**Average Daily Numbers of Calls for Service and Numbers of Garda Mobile Crews Available to Command and Control in a Selected Division ("Division X") of the DMR by Hour of Day in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008**




**FIGURE L:**

**Average Daily Numbers of Calls for Service and Garda Mobile Crews Available to Command and Control in a Selected Garda Division ("Division Y") of the DMR by Hour of Day in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008**




**FIGURE M:**

**Average Numbers of Calls for Service and Garda Mobile Crews Available to Command and Control in a selected Garda Division of the DMR by Hours of Day on the four Tuesdays in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008**



**FIGURE N:**

**Average Numbers of Calls for Service and Garda Mobile Crews Available to Command and Control in a Selected Garda Division of the DMR by Hour of Day on the Four Saturdays in the Roster Period 11 February to 9 March 2008**



The Inspectorate cautions against reading too much into this limited analysis of four weeks of CAD data. The Inspectorate’s purpose in presenting the results of the analysis is solely to highlight the value of monitoring data on the demand for Garda services and the numbers of available Garda response units. Ideally, the levels of available Garda resources should increase and decrease in line with changes

in demand for services. The ultimate goal should be to achieve the closest possible matching of resources to varying levels of demand. This would ensure that the response to public calls for service is well managed and that maximum time is available for proactive police work. This is the approach being taken by leading police organisations in the area of resource allocation (See Chapter 6).

## Graduated Response to Calls for Assistance

The Inspectorate was informed that it is Garda policy to attend the scene of each call for assistance. This amounts to a very significant demand on resources, especially at busy times when response units are dealing with a backlog of calls. The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána adopt the widely accepted practice among police services in other jurisdictions of locating a helpdesk in control rooms to enable the needs of some callers to be met over the phone without dispatch of a patrol car.

### One-Officer v. Two-Officer Dispatch

There has been considerable discussion in policing on the merits of one-officer versus two-officer response teams from an efficiency perspective. Clearly, having one police officer per patrol car would afford the opportunity to deploy more cars and increase police visibility. It should also mean that at any given time a patrol car would be in closer proximity to a location from which a call for service is made. On the other hand, there are many occasions in modern policing when it is necessary to have two officers at a scene. The indications are that a two-officer patrol unit is more cost effective than two one-officer units in responding to calls that require the presence of at least two police officers.<sup>94</sup> Police officer safety must be paramount in making deployment decisions.

The standard deployment in the Garda Síochána, as in many other police services, is two officers per car. The Inspectorate supports this model as a general policy. However, there are many non-emergency calls for service that can be handled satisfactorily by one rather than two police officers without compromising safety. In the interest of efficiency, a police service should have a combination of one- and two-officer patrol units and well defined dispatch criteria. The Inspectorate has noted that Garda motorcycles are now almost exclusively assigned to traffic units. There is a strong efficiency argument for using motorcycles and bicycles in mainstream response policing, especially in urban areas. The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda

Síochána deploy more one-officer mobile units to non-emergency calls in urban areas where back-up is close at hand and use more motorcycles and bicycles for this purpose.

A concern was raised with the Inspectorate about assignments that involve one Garda patrolling an extensive rural area at night time. The Inspectorate shares this concern and believes that such assignments should be avoided. If, in exceptional circumstances, such an assignment is made, the Garda concerned should be briefed by a supervisor, guided by an operational protocol, and have designated back-up. In due course, all Garda units should be supported by GPS facilities in Garda control rooms to identify their location for safety purposes (see next section and page 54 of this report).

## Management and Supervision

Police managers and supervisors have a large part to play in ensuring an efficient and effective match of response units to calls for service. A current difficulty in the Garda Síochána is that there is insufficient time being given to hands-on supervision of patrol units. Sergeants say they are desk-bound with paperwork. Almost all of them wish to spend more time in the field with their units but say that they find themselves unable to do so. In the course of interviews the Inspectorate was repeatedly told that a sergeant's voice is rarely heard on Garda radio. It was also observed that there is an absence of close working between supervisors and dispatchers.

The absence of effective supervision impacts the quality and delivery of Garda services on the street. Many new Gardaí are providing excellent service, but not all are getting the mentoring and support they require to reach their full potential. Drivers of patrol cars are too often left to decide on the basis of their professional instincts where they should patrol rather than be directed to specific locations at specific times based on scientific crime/incident analysis. Through no fault of the officers concerned, this leads to random patrolling, which studies show produces random results. Absence of on-street supervision also means that it is not unknown for a number of patrol cars to be at the scene of an incident even though they were not dispatched to it.

<sup>94</sup> Vancouver Police Department Patrol Deployment Study, pages 920-966, accessible at <http://vancouver.ca/police/Planning/PatrolDeploymentStudy.pdf>

A difficulty for Garda managers and supervisors is that they do not know precisely where their patrol units are at any given time. Global positioning systems (GPS), which are now standard technology in policing internationally and in Irish fire and ambulance services, are not available to the Garda Síochána. This means that neither Garda control rooms nor supervisors know which patrol unit is closest to the scene of an urgent call for assistance.

Not knowing the location of a patrol unit can also have serious safety implications. GPS is vital in speedily locating a police officer who is in difficulty and who is unable to call for assistance. The new Garda digital radio system will provide the platform for GPS. It is important that GPS be made available to Garda control rooms and supervisors at the earliest possible date.

Garda managers and supervisors do not have sufficient information to support them in achieving best possible management of their patrol resources. They do not have consolidated data on how much time their units spend on patrol, responding to calls, preparing files or attending court. Given that personnel time is the most significant cost in policing, Garda managers need more and better information on how their officers' time is being spent. The first step towards better information is more effective collection, analysis and use of the data that is currently available. The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána develop new managerial and supervisory approaches to resource deployment based on robust and timely data.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 10

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána take immediate steps to improve the quality of CAD data in the DMR and derive maximum benefit from it for resource management purposes.

### Recommendation 11

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána adopt a graduated response to calls for assistance. The Garda Síochána should adopt the widely accepted practice among police services in other jurisdictions of locating a helpdesk in control rooms to enable the needs of some callers to be met over the phone without dispatch of a patrol car.

### Recommendation 12

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána deploy more one-officer mobile units to non-emergency calls in urban areas where back-up is close at hand and use more motorcycles and bicycles for this purpose. One-officer patrols in extensive rural areas should be avoided. If, in exceptional circumstances, such a patrol is so assigned, the Garda concerned should be briefed by a supervisor, guided by an operational protocol, and have designated back-up.

### Recommendation 13

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána develop new managerial and supervisory approaches to resource deployment based on robust and timely data.

Chapter  
**06**

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INTERNATIONAL  
DIRECTIONS IN  
POLICE RESOURCE  
ALLOCATION

Demands for greater efficiencies in the use of police resources are intensifying. Faced with unprecedented pressures on public finances, the challenge for governments and police services alike is to use taxpayers' money to the best possible advantage in serving the community. Because a police service spends the bulk of its budget on remuneration of its personnel, it follows that the search for greater efficiency must focus primarily on achieving best possible deployment of human resources. In other jurisdictions, efficiencies have been achieved as part of broad public service programmes aimed at delivering better value for money. Elsewhere, more efficient allocations of police resources have flowed from management decisions taken within progressive police organisations. The human resource initiatives that are most likely to achieve sustained efficiencies into the future are those that incorporate benefits for the community, the police organisation and police officers. These benefits must be apparent to all.

This chapter looks at three key initiatives in North America and the UK that the Inspectorate believes are most relevant to developing more efficient resource allocation in Irish policing at this time. These are:

- Achieving more balanced police officer workloads, leading to improved service to the community and increased officer safety.
- Adopting policy on allocation of police time.
- Achieving closer alignment of police working times with patterns of demand for police services.

### Balanced Police Workloads Leading to Improved Service to the Community and Increased Officer Safety

Police services and citizens everywhere are well aware that police workload and resources are not evenly distributed among all communities. These imbalances have implications for both the public and police officers. Communities served by relatively fewer patrol officers are more likely to have to wait longer for police assistance in emergency situations. In high crime areas there can be an increased risk to police officers if resources are spread thinly in the effort to meet multiple demands.

Every police organisation has a responsibility to balance patrol officer numbers with patrol workload in the various communities in its jurisdiction. Far too often, however, they do not have the necessary data or the analytical tools required to fully comprehend all of the factors involved. This situation is changing.

Currently a number of US and Canadian police services are taking more scientific approaches to determining more equitable and efficient allocations of their patrol officers, i.e. the front-line uniformed officers who respond to calls for police assistance and provide a visible police presence in the community. For instance, the Seattle Police Department uses commercial software to provide more balanced patrol services in all areas of the city. Using this software to analyse its computer aided dispatch data, the Department has established fifty-one new beat areas for the city, grouped into five precincts. The beat areas, which vary in size, are defined such that, as far as possible, they have equal patrol workloads and are assigned equal numbers of patrol officers. The new beat areas, allied with the department's new 10-hour shift system for patrol officers, have enabled the Seattle Police Department to commit to:

- A seven-minute average emergency response time, anywhere in the city at any time of day or night and on any day of the week.

- 30% proactive, supervisor-directed patrol time.
- Ten patrol cars (two per precinct) free citywide at all times for added proactive work and, if required, to boost response in the interest of citizen and officer safety.

Similar approaches to patrol deployment are in place in several other police departments in the US (Los Angeles, CA, Charlotte, VA, Richmond, VA, Montgomery County, MD, Knoxville, TE, and Shreveport, LA), and in the police departments of Calgary, Edmonton, and Waterloo in Canada. Specially-established teams are in place so that resource deployment can be constantly monitored against patrol workload. In Seattle, for instance, the aim is for each patrol unit to meet the seven-minute target emergency response time and to provide the required 30% proactive policing time in its beat area without assistance from patrol units from other areas.

The Garda Inspectorate is impressed by the potential of structured patrol deployment models such as the one in place in Seattle. These models have a solid statistical base in queuing theory and operations research. In the right hands, they offer the prospect of better service to the community, more equal sharing of workload between police officers and improved officer safety. They contribute significant management information to guide decisions on resource allocation and provide a reliable and objective measurement of the number of officers required in a police department's patrol function.

## Policy on Allocation of Police Time

Time management is critical to efficiency in all organisations, including the police. Given the proportion of the annual budget spent on human resources, every police organisation should have a clear policy on allocation of police time. Information systems should continuously track police time allocations without imposing an unreasonable record-keeping burden on police officers and staff.

Increasing numbers of US and Canadian police services are adopting a policy on the allocation of the working time of their patrol officers. The policy, which is endorsed by the International Association

of Chiefs of Police and by the Police Executive Research Forum in the USA, advocates division of patrol officers' time into three roughly equal parts:

- **Reactive** time spent responding to calls for police assistance.
- **Administrative** time, spent on activities such as taking statements, writing reports, attending court, training, briefing by supervisors and meal breaks.
- **Proactive** time spent on community policing, crime prevention patrols, traffic stops, intelligence gathering and other similar supervisor-directed activity.

This policy creates benchmarks for police use of time. It aims to allocate two-thirds of patrol officers' time to operational duties. It encourages better time management of reactive and administrative work to enable patrol officers to spend one third of their time on proactive duties that are highly-valued by the public. Time allocations are tracked using robust data from computer aided dispatch systems.

The policy finds favour with patrol officers by acknowledging the diverse demands being made on them. It ensures that officers get more rounded experience of reactive, administrative and proactive policing. For supervisors and patrol officers, the model helps achieve a measured balance of workload between individual members of patrol teams.

The Garda Inspectorate sees significant merit in this policy on allocation of patrol officer time. The model for patrol officers is relatively simple in concept but has the potential to be a powerful tool in its application.

## Closer Alignment of Police Resources with Changing Levels of Demand for Services

More and more police services in the US, Canada and the UK are varying the numbers of on-duty police officers and staff consistent with anticipated levels of demand for police services.

Calculating the number of police officers and staff required for duty at any given time relies on identifying changes in the level of police workload and aligning officer work schedules to

them. Equipped with workload analysis, police organisations are now putting in place more flexible shift arrangements for police officers. For instance, the Seattle Police Department is moving from three daily nine-hour patrol shifts to a new system of five ten-hour shifts each day to achieve greater responsiveness to public needs at peak demand times. Similarly, Staffordshire Police and other police services in the UK have introduced a variable shift arrangement (VSA) in which five teams work a 10-week shift cycle to achieve a better match with observed public demand for police services, especially during peak demand times on Friday nights.

It is now standard practice for leading police services to have full-time resource management teams constantly monitoring all relevant data on police workload and response. The teams aim to achieve the closest possible match between anticipated levels of police workload and the numbers of police officers on duty. The key breakthrough in the UK in this regard has been the use by police services of two sets of commercial software. One facilitates measurement of demand for police services through analysis of CAD data. The other helps manage police officer availability through on-line management of rostered hours, overtime and absences (leave, sick leave etc). Together, these systems are supporting a more structured approach to the allocation of police resources.

Chapter  
**07**

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A NEW APPROACH  
TO RESOURCE  
ALLOCATION IN THE  
GARDA SÍOCHÁNA

It is clear from the data in the preceding Chapters of this report that there is much to be gained from a new emphasis on resource allocation in the Garda Síochána. This chapter outlines the key steps required to bring the organisation into line with leading police services in this area.

### Information

Currently, the biggest single deficit in the achievement of better resource allocation in the Garda Síochána is information. Garda management does not know the amount of police time being demanded by the public or how Garda time is being spent. Without this information, it is not possible to achieve potential efficiencies in the allocation of Garda time.

As a first step, the Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Commissioner immediately establish a National Resource Deployment Team to develop a resource allocation plan for the Garda Síochána. Ideally, the team should include sworn personnel, a civilian analyst and a professional project manager experienced in the development of strategic resource allocation in a police environment.

The DMR should be the pilot region for implementation of the national resource allocation plan. Experience gained in the pilot should inform roll-out in the other five regions.

The Inspectorate sees four elements to a national resource allocation plan for the Garda Síochána:

- New technologies.
- New communications policy involving control room rationalisation.
- New regional resource deployment units.
- New rosters.

### New Technologies


If sensible and necessary resource allocation is to be achieved in the Garda Síochána, there is no alternative to investment in the following modern systems:

- Computer aided dispatch system (CAD).
- Resource management system (RMS).
- Demand profiling software (DPS).

The following diagram illustrates how these systems would fit together to provide a new approach to resource allocation and deployment.

CHART O:

Proposed New Resource Allocation Approach in the Garda Síochána



Essentially, the new demand profiling software (DPS) would combine call data from CAD with inputted details of planned/known events (festivals, sports events, protest marches, etc.) likely to require a police presence. The combined data would be used to generate a profile of policing demands, which, in turn, would be used to calculate the preferred numbers of Gardaí to be on duty at any given time.

Knowing the preferred on-duty numbers, local Garda management would seek to achieve them by managing abstractions from duty (leave, sick leave, training, etc.) using the resource management system (RMS). They would be guided by demand/resource profiles similar to the example at Appendix 12.

Adopting this new approach to resource allocation would realise important benefits. The public would benefit because the numbers of Gardaí on duty would be set to match the identified policing needs of the community. Garda managers and supervisors would benefit because they would be better supported in matching resources to anticipated policing demands. Police officers would benefit by having a more even spread of workload and increased officer safety during busy times.

Until such time as CAD, RMS and DPS are in place, neither Garda management nor Government will have an accurate, objective measurement of front-line policing demands and the resources required to meet them. These technologies are by no means luxuries in modern police services. CAD is already commonplace in policing. RMS and DPS are quickly becoming standard policing support tools.

The critical first step in procuring and implementing these systems is the development of a fully functional and well managed CAD system.

### *National CAD System*

Modern police services across the globe have realised the value of investment in CAD systems. At the operational level, the advent of global positioning systems (GPS) and the geocoding of addresses have added greatly to the power of CAD in managing the response to calls for assistance from members of the public. At the strategic level,

police organisations now use CAD to provide objective measurement of policing demands for resource allocation purposes.

The Garda Síochána is very exceptional among modern police services in not having a jurisdiction-wide CAD system. It is also exceptional in this respect among the emergency services in the State. Fire and ambulances units in the State already have up-to-date CAD systems equipped with the latest mapping and geocoding systems. Priority must be given in the Garda budget to addressing this deficiency at the earliest possible opportunity. Until such time as this is achieved, Garda management will not have complete and meaningful data on operational workloads and performance and operational Gardaí will not have the full benefits of modern support and safety systems.

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána develop a national CAD system, incorporating GPS facilities, a geo-directory and DPS, by means of a twin-track approach. On one track, the Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána replace the outdated CAD system in the DMR immediately. The control room manager should report directly to the Assistant Commissioner, DMR.

Reliable data from a new DMR CAD system should help achieve:

- Improved resource management.
- Reduced and consistent response times to all areas of the Region.
- Balanced workloads between Garda divisions in the Region.
- More community-focused service to the DMR public.

On the other track, a CAD system should be provided outside the DMR. Following the introduction of ECAS (a new Emergency Call Answering Service to be provided by a telecoms operator in 2010), all “999” calls for Garda assistance outside the DMR will be routed to twenty-two Garda divisional control rooms (instead of ninety-four locations at present). It does not make financial sense to provide costly CAD systems in each of these twenty-two control rooms. That must await further rationalisation of the number of Garda control rooms as part of a new

policy on Garda communications with members of the public. Pending rationalisation, the Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána make a computerised record of the particulars of every “999” call received at the twenty-two divisional control rooms outside the DMR, including the time of the call, dispatch time, arrival time at scene and the call clearance time. This data is important for effective management of emergency Garda response.

## Communications Policy and Rationalisation of Control Rooms

The Garda Síochána has long appreciated the importance of good contacts with members of the community to the provision of effective police services. It is important, therefore, that the Garda Síochána has efficient systems in place to accept telephone and, indeed, all electronic communications from the public in a professional, consistent and customer-focused manner.

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána devise and publish a policy on telecommunications contacts with members of the public. The Inspectorate believes that a cornerstone of the policy should be:

- Replacement of existing Garda control rooms with two mirror-image national Garda controls rooms staffed mostly by trained civilian call takers and dispatchers to handle all emergency (“999”) and non-emergency calls from members of the public.
- Publication of a single Garda Síochána non-emergency telephone number for use by members of the public.
- Establishment within each call centre of a Garda helpdesk to assist callers whose needs can be met without dispatch of a Garda unit.
- Publication and ongoing monitoring of call handling standards.

The benefits of this approach would include:

- Improved and more consistent call handling with constant monitoring of standards.
- Release for outdoor operational duties of Gardaí currently assigned to divisional control rooms.

- Quantification of Garda workload countrywide so as to achieve better matching of the numbers of police officers on duty to public demands for police services.
- Vastly improved incident recording.
- Reduced pressures on busy public offices in Garda stations.

The Garda Síochána is already exploring the option of reducing the number of control rooms to not more than three. The Inspectorate recommends provision of two mirror-image national Garda control rooms unless it can be conclusively shown that there is an overriding case for a third. Providing two, rather than three control rooms would reduce capital costs and generate economies of scale while still maintaining resilience.

Provision of new control room accommodation and systems will involve significant initial outlay to reap long-term savings and improvements in service. In the interest of minimising upfront costs to the public purse, rationalisation of Garda control rooms and investment in new CAD systems should be considered in the wider context of achieving greater efficiency in all emergency services. The State has already made the very sensible decision that the imminent National Digital Radio System should be available to all “blue-light” services. Similarly, it makes economic sense for the emergency services to share control rooms and operate seamless CAD services. Such an arrangement would be entirely consistent with the OECD vision of an integrated Irish Public Service in which people “are enabled to work together across existing structures to allow greater connectivity between different sectors ... [and] more collaborative, horizontal approaches ...in responding to societal needs.”<sup>95</sup>

Even in the best economic circumstances, the State and its taxpayers can ill afford to fund three national fire control rooms, eight national ambulance control rooms and two national Garda control rooms. Many US State and city administrations have developed Public Service Access Points (PSAP), which are shared control room facilities for their police, fire and ambulance services. Gloucestershire and Wiltshire in England have co-located their police,

<sup>95</sup> OECD. IRELAND, Towards an Integrated Public Service, page 13, accessible at [http://www.bettergov.ie/attached\\_files/upload/IRELAND-Towards%20An%20Integrated%20Public%20Service.pdf](http://www.bettergov.ie/attached_files/upload/IRELAND-Towards%20An%20Integrated%20Public%20Service.pdf).

fire and ambulance services in shared “Tri-Service” control rooms. The Northern Territory in Australia operates a full-integrated Joint Emergency Services Communications Centre for police, fire and ambulance. The Dublin Fire Service and the Ambulance Service are already co-located in a control room at Tara Street.

The Inspectorate considers that there are significant advantages for the State in pursuing co-location and closer integration of the emergency services:

- Faster, more efficient and professional service to the public. Currently, in Ireland, when a caller requires the services of two or more emergency services, it is necessary to make separate telephone calls to each service. This eats up valuable time in life threatening situations. In an integrated CAD system, a Garda call taker could avoid delay by electronically transmitting incident details to fire and ambulance dispatchers.
- Reduced capital costs in rationalising existing control rooms.
- Lower future operating and maintenance costs.
- Better resilience in the event of an operating failure affecting any one service.
- Future scope both for (i) further reductions in emergency response times and (ii) cost reductions to the public, by accepting calls direct from telephone subscribers without the need for an intermediary Emergency Call Answering Service (ECAS) telecoms operator.

The Inspectorate recommends that the Government have regard to the potential for economies and efficiencies through co-location and integration of the control room systems of the Garda Síochána and other emergency services.

Co-location/integration of the control room systems of the emergency services is a major undertaking. It is important that preparatory discussions and planning commence at an early date. During this time, no decision should be taken that would obstruct potential sharing of control rooms or waste money by investing in non-efficient systems.

## Regional Resource Deployment Units

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána establish a resource deployment unit in each Garda region, commencing in the DMR at the earliest possible date. The units would determine the numbers of Gardaí required for duty at any given time based on predicted and planned policing requirements.

Each regional resource deployment unit should include personnel with operational policing experience and civilian analyst expertise. All members of the unit should be trained in the use of whatever demand and resource management/profiling systems are procured by the Garda Síochána.

The team leader should report to the Regional Assistant Commissioner and liaise with the divisional chief superintendents. Each chief superintendent should nominate an inspector responsible for overseeing the management of abstractions from duty at district/station levels.

The Inspectorate recommends that one of the first tasks of the DMR Resource Deployment Unit should be the development of incident data recording standards and effective data audit procedures to ensure the completeness and accuracy of CAD data. The new standards should require immediate updating of CAD records by all front-line officers as their operational status (“At Scene” etc.) changes. (Updating should be done by means of voiceless transmissions on the new digital radio system.) Officer safety should be paramount when developing these standards.

## Rosters

Chapter 4 of this report makes the case for replacement of the current Garda rosters. It is not the purpose of this report to prescribe new rosters for the Garda Síochána. That is a matter for discussions involving Garda management and the Garda representative associations and, by agreement, within the framework of the Garda Conciliation and Arbitration Council. What the Inspectorate can usefully do, however, is suggest guiding principles for the development of new rosters.

New Garda rosters should:

- Be consistent with the terms of the EU Working Time Directive as clarified in judgements of the European Court of Justice and accord with evidence-based good practice. Other than in emergency situations, Gardaí must work no more than an average of forty-eight hours per week, receive a minimum break between shifts of eleven hours every twenty-four hours, work no more than eight hours in any period of twenty-four hours during which they work at night, work no more than four consecutive night shifts, receive a minimum of thirty-six consecutive hours of rest every week, start the day shift no earlier than 7 a.m., minimise the frequency of shift rotations and rotate shifts in a clock-wise direction.
- Provide the flexibility to have the right numbers of Gardaí on operational duty to match predicted levels of demand for police services.
- Incorporate recognised health and safety guidelines for shift working.
- Provide sensible work-life balance for Gardaí, giving good notice of work rotas and some weekends free.

In order to achieve better matching of the numbers of Gardaí on duty to the levels of police services being demanded by the public, it may be necessary to introduce longer shift times and flexible shift-start times. Members of “regular” Garda units have volunteered to the Inspectorate that they would prefer to work longer shifts and have more time off between shifts. The Inspectorate would caution, however, against the introduction of long fixed shifts such as the twelve-hour shifts worked in police services elsewhere. These shifts may seem attractive initially to both management and individual police officers but the Inspectorate is convinced that they:

- Do not support delivery of optimum police services.
- Create safety risks for individual officers, especially officers who drive lengthy commutes.

Dr Charles Czeisler has advised that a study of 90,000 person-years of employment revealed that working at least twelve hours per day was

associated with a 37% increased hazard rate.<sup>96</sup> A twelve-hour night shift combines the effects of extended work hours with work at the circadian nadir of alertness. The result of this combination can be a significant decrease in alertness and performance, with an associated increase in the risk of fatigue-related error and accident. This is why the EWTD restricts work hours that include night work to no more than eight hours. Given that full time employees on twelve-hour schedules work fifty to 100 fewer days per year than do full-time employees on eight-hour work schedules, such compressed work week schedules are typically quite popular among shift workers. Therefore, studies evaluating compressed work weeks which are based strictly on subjective questionnaire data are often positive, especially since most such studies involve the impact of twelve-hour day shifts or employees on permanent shifts.<sup>97</sup> When workers experienced with both eight- and twelve-hour night shifts were asked which shift resulted in fatigue which decreased their performance at work, eighty percent of respondents felt that the twelve-hour workday resulted in the least efficient performance due to fatigue.<sup>98</sup> In a modelling study conducted by Ontario Hydro in Toronto, Canada, it was estimated that human error by operators would be doubled by a change from eight-hour to twelve-hour shifts due to fatigue and misalignment of circadian phase. This resulted in a seventy percent increase in their risk assessment of a public accident.<sup>99</sup> In addition, studies of conversions from eight-hour to twelve-hour shifts in a power plant and a natural gas utility conducted by researchers at the U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) have led to the conclusion that introduction of twelve-hour shifts result in consistent declines in performance and alertness and increased fatigue. Such decrements were most prominent during the twelve-hour night shift, when fatigue from the extended duty schedule combined

96 Dembe AE, Erickson JB, Delbos RG, Banks SM. The impact of overtime and long work hours on occupational injuries and illnesses: new evidence from the United States. *Occup Environ Med* 2005;62:588-597.

97 Thomas H, Schwartz E, Whitehead DC. Eight-Versus 12-Hour Shifts: Implications for Emergency Physicians. *Emer Med* 1994; 23:1096-1100.

98 Colligan MJ, Tepas DI. The stress of hours of work. *Am Ind Hyg Assoc J* 1986; 47:686-695.

99 Kelly RJ, Schneider MF. The twelve-hour shift revisited: Recent trends in the electric power industry. *J Human Ergol (Tokyo)* 1982; 11:369-384.

with the increased circadian drive for sleep.<sup>100</sup> After accounting for practice, it was found that reaction time was significantly slower on the twelve-hour vs. the eight-hour shift at all times of day, and that 187 percent more errors in grammatical reasoning were expected on the twelve-hour schedule as compared with the eight-hour shift schedule.<sup>101 102</sup> Furthermore, they found a percentage of signals missed in a simple reaction time test were three to five times greater on the twelve-hour shifts than on the eight-hour shifts.<sup>103</sup> They concluded that during the latter half of twelve-hour overnight shifts, workers were particularly susceptible to fatigue related errors and accidents.<sup>104</sup>

Garda management and the Garda representative associations already recognise that there is no such thing as a “one size fits all” roster in policing. For instance, the demands on “regular” units and community policing units are different and must be reflected in different work rosters. All future rosters should incorporate flexibility arrangements such as variable start times aimed at achieving the best possible fit with predicted/planned policing requirements.

### *Health and Safety*

Negotiations on new Garda rosters must have due regard to health and safety considerations at all times. The significance of health and safety should not lose out in the balancing of management and officer needs that is part of all roster negotiations.

Dr Charles Czeisler has reviewed a substantial body of research on health and safety aspects of shift working that provides a basis for good practice guidelines. He has indicated that, while no roster can eliminate the need for police to work at night,

the sleep loss associated with night shift work and its attendant health risks can be minimised. For these reasons, other than in emergency situations, Gardaí should work no more than an average of forty-eight hours per week, receive a minimum break between shifts of eleven hours every twenty-four hours, work no more than eight hours in any period of twenty-four hours during which they work at night, work no more than four consecutive night shifts, receive a minimum of thirty-six consecutive hours of rest every week, start the early shift no earlier than 7 a.m., minimise the frequency of shift rotations and rotate shifts in a clock-wise (forward) direction. Moreover, implementation of the principle of staffing that is proportional to the need for service will reduce the amount of night work required of Gardaí. These principles are consistent with the recommendations of the Dublin-based European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions ([www.eurofound.europa.eu/](http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/)),<sup>105</sup> as noted by the Garda Síochána SMI Review Group in 1998,<sup>106</sup> which include minimising the sequence of night shifts, such that only two to four night shifts in succession should be worked; avoiding fast double-backs<sup>107</sup>; avoiding overlong work sequences; rotating forward; delaying morning start; and limiting short-term rota changes.

### *Negotiation/Implementation Programme*

Negotiation of new Garda rosters will be a significant undertaking. The Inspectorate recommends that Garda management and the Garda representative associations begin discussions at the earliest opportunity.

The discussions should aim for initial agreement on a new roster for the DMR. Ideally, CAD data would be available for the other five Garda regions before finalising new rosters for them. In the event that this is not the case, there may be some advantage in implementing the new DMR roster in urban areas outside Dublin in advance of CAD coming on stream. Ultimately, however, maximum Garda efficiencies will be achievable only through local

100 Rosa RR, Bonnet MH, Bootzin RR, Eastman CI, Monk T, Penn PE et al. Intervention factors for promoting adjustment to nightwork and shiftwork. *Occup Med* 1990; 5:391-415.

101 Rosa RR, Colligan MJ. Extended workdays: effects of 8-hour and 12-hour rotating shift schedules on performance, subjective alertness, sleep patterns, and psychosocial variables. *Work and Stress* 1989; 3:21-32.

102 Lewis PM, Swaim DJ, Rosa RR, Colligan MJ, Booth RJ, Swint MJ. Evaluation of the 12-Hour Shift Schedule at the Fast Flux Test Facility. Westinghouse Hannaford 1995.

103 Rosa RR, Bonnet MH. Performance and Alertness on 8 h and 12 h rotating shifts at a natural gas utility. *Ergonomics* 1995; 36:1177-1193.

104 Rosa RR, Colligan MJ. Application of a portable test battery in the assessment of fatigue in laboratory and worksite studies of 12-hour shifts. *Work Environ Health* 1995; 18:113-115.

105 Bulletin of European Studies on Time (BEST) 11 (1998). Continuous Shift Systems. (Dublin, Ireland: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions).

106 SMI Review Group, Proposed Framework for Rostering in the Garda Síochána, Garda Headquarters, 20th May 1998, page 8.

107 A fast double-back involves working a full shift and beginning another after a break of eight or fewer hours.

Garda deployment, supervision and management based on objective policing demands assessed from CAD data.

The Inspectorate is satisfied that replacement of the current Garda rosters can result in a win: win outcome for Garda management and individual Gardaí and ensure a better police service for the community.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 14

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Commissioner immediately establish a National Resource Deployment Team to develop a resource allocation plan for the Garda Síochána. Ideally, the team should include sworn personnel, a civilian analyst and a professional project manager experienced in the development of strategic resource allocation in a police environment.

### Recommendation 15

The Inspectorate recommends that the DMR should be the pilot region for implementation of the national resource allocation plan. Experience gained in the pilot should inform roll-out in the other five regions.

### Recommendation 16

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána develop a national CAD system, incorporating GPS facilities, a geo-directory and DPS.

### Recommendation 17

The Inspectorate recommends that, as a first step in the development of a national CAD, the Garda Síochána replace the current outdated system in the DMR immediately. The control room manager should report directly to the Assistant Commissioner, DMR.

### Recommendation 18

The Inspectorate recommends that, pending control room rationalisation (see recommendations 20 and 21), the Garda Síochána make a computerised record of the particulars of every “999” call received at the twenty-two divisional control rooms outside

the DMR, including the time of the call, dispatch time, arrival time at scene and the call clearance time.

### Recommendation 19

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána devise and publish a policy on telecommunications contacts with members of the public.

### Recommendation 20

The Inspectorate recommends the provision of two mirror-image national Garda control rooms unless it can be conclusively shown that there is an overriding case for a third.

### Recommendation 21

The Inspectorate recommends that the Government have regard to the potential to achieve economies and efficiencies through co-location and integration of the control room systems of the Garda Síochána and other emergency services.

### Recommendation 22

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Síochána establish a resource deployment unit in each Garda region, commencing in the DMR at the earliest possible date. The units would determine the numbers of Gardaí required for duty at any given time based on predicted and planned policing requirements. Each regional resource deployment unit should include personnel with operational policing experience and civilian analyst expertise.

### Recommendation 23

The Inspectorate recommends that one of the first tasks of the DMR Resource Deployment Unit should be the development of incident data recording standards and effective data audit procedures to ensure the completeness and accuracy of CAD data. The new standards should require immediate updating of dispatch records by all front-line officers as their operational status (“At Scene” etc.) changes. (Updating should be done by means of voiceless transmissions on the new digital radio system.) Officer safety should be paramount when developing these standards.

#### Recommendation 24

The Inspectorate recommends that Garda management and the Garda representative associations begin discussions on new rosters at the earliest opportunity. The new rosters should:

- Be consistent with the terms of the EWTD as clarified in judgements of the European Court of Justice and accord with evidence-based good practice (see recommendation 6).
- Provide the flexibility to have the right numbers of Gardaí on operational duty to match predicted levels of demand for police services.
- Incorporate recognised health and safety guidelines for shift working.
- Provide sensible work-life balance for Gardaí, giving good notice of work rotas and some weekends free.

Chapter  
**08**

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GARDA CHARTER

The Programme for Government (June, 2007) includes a commitment to “introduce a Garda Charter setting out targeted Garda response times and levels of service which the public can expect, including frequency of high visibility patrols in urban and rural communities.”

In the terms of reference for this inspection the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform sought the Inspectorate’s advice on development and implementation of the Charter having regard to policing charters in other jurisdictions and currently available Garda data on response times. This chapter responds specifically to that request.

The Inspectorate sees the development of a Garda Charter, which would set down specific service-level commitments to the public, as a natural follow-on to implementation of the recommendations of Chapter 7 of this report. Once the Garda Síochána is in a strong position to measure and manage demand for Garda services, the time will be ripe for the organisation to make specific commitments to the public on response times and levels of service.

## Policing Charters in Other Jurisdictions

The Inspectorate has researched charter-type commitments made by police services in other countries. Typically, they comprise target times for answering emergency calls in the police control room and getting patrol units to the scene. In most cases, these commitments are published as key performance indicators in corporate plans.

Two initiatives in other police services are of particular interest in the context of developing a Garda Charter. The first of these is the publication by the Seattle Police Department of specific response and proactive policing targets.<sup>108</sup> The second initiative is the Policing Pledge (see Appendix 13 to this report) published by forty-three police services in England and Wales in 2008. This initiative emerged from consultations on the UK Government’s Policing Green Paper (“From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing Our Communities Together”).<sup>109</sup> Each police service in England and Wales publicly pledges to:

- Answer “999,” i.e. emergency calls, within 10 seconds, giving an estimated time of arrival and undertaking to get police officers to the scene safely and as quickly as possible.
- Get to the scene of an emergency in an urban area within fifteen minutes (four police services aim for within ten minutes and one within twelve minutes).
- Get to the scene of an emergency in a rural area within 20 minutes.
- Answer non-emergency calls promptly and, if it is necessary to attend the scene, give an estimated time of arrival aiming:
  - To be with a vulnerable or upset caller within sixty minutes.
  - To be with a person calling about an agreed neighbourhood priority within sixty minutes.
  - Where appropriate, to meet with the caller within forty-eight hours.
- Where it is agreed that attendance at a scene is not necessary, give advice, answer questions and/or put the caller in touch with someone who can help.

<sup>108</sup> Average emergency response time of seven minutes, 30% of patrol officers’ time spent on proactive policing and a minimum of ten patrol cars available city-wide at all times for proactive duty and to boost emergency response – see Chapter 6 of this report.

<sup>109</sup> <http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-reform/green-paper-responses?view=Binary> (Accessed on 13 March, 2009)

As regards police visibility, the Policing Pledge provides for neighbourhood policing teams and other police patrols to be visible and “on your patch” at times when they will be most effective and when the public say they most need them. More particularly, the Pledge commits to having neighbourhood policing teams spend at least 80% of their time visibly working in neighbourhoods, tackling priorities. The teams are committed to responding within twenty-four hours to messages directed to them and, where necessary, providing a more detailed response as soon as they can.

The Policing Pledge also contains police commitments on arranging regular public meetings and providing feedback, especially to victims of crime. Police service also undertake to acknowledge within twenty-four hours any dissatisfaction expressed by a person in regard to a service provided by the police.

## Public Policing Commitments

Whatever format a police service uses to publicise its service-level commitments to the public, it is important that:

- The public clearly understand the standards they can expect from the police.
- The standards are measurable, i.e. they set specific response times, visibility levels and deadlines.
- Police performance against the standards is measured and published.

The Inspectorate believes that these three principles should guide the preparation of a Garda Charter.

## Measurable Targets

The most challenging task in developing and operating a Garda Charter will be the setting of targets against which actual performance can be measured. Without a State-wide CAD system the Garda Síochána is simply not in a position to report efficiently or accurately on its actual response times to all emergency and non-emergency calls, or the proportion of time spent by Gardaí on operational duty in the community.

One option is to introduce a Garda Charter on an incremental basis beginning with the DMR where a CAD system is already in place. Ideally, the introduction should coincide with the:

- Implementation of planned new CAD software in the DMR that will include appropriate real-time reporting facilities.
- Provision of capability within the Garda digital radio system that enables all patrol units in the DMR to update their status on the CAD system without assistance from Control Room dispatchers. (This is essential to improving data on policing demands and resource deployment.)
- Introduction of best practice management and operating procedures in the DMR control room backed by clear policies, training and supervision.
- Acquisition and development of expertise in control room management and resource deployment that is geared more directly towards efficient and effective service to callers.
- New divisional reporting and accountability relationships to regional assistance commissioners focused on achieving better matching of resources to workload in the interest of better service to the community.

## Emergency Response Times

The indications are that police emergency response times for incidents in urban areas are tending towards an unofficial standard of seven minutes in Canada and the US,<sup>110</sup> and fifteen minutes in the UK. Four UK police services (Dorset, Essex, Merseyside and West Midlands) have committed to ten minutes in their respective Policing Pledges. The London Metropolitan Police has committed to a target emergency response time of twelve minutes. In Australia, the New South Wales Police aims to respond to 80% of urgent calls for assistance within ten minutes.

<sup>110</sup> Patrol Deployment Study, Vancouver Police Department page 21, accessible at <http://vancouver.ca/police/Planning/PatrolDeploymentStudy.pdf>.

TABLE 3:

## Garda Síochána Response Times to “Emergency” and “Category 1” Calls in the DMR in 2007

DMR Division	Total “Emergency” and “Category 1” Call Load	“Emergency” and “Category 1” Calls for which an “At Scene” time is Recorded	Number and Percentage of “Emergency” and “Category 1” Calls with an “At Scene” Time that were Responded to within:		
			Seven Minutes	Ten Minutes	Fifteen Minutes
Western	9,610	6,057	2,460 (41%)	3,289 (54%)	4,088 (67%)
Northern	7,192	4,657	2,456 (53%)	3,068 (66%)	3,611 (78%)
South Central	7,123	4,974	3,586 (72%)	4,043 (81%)	4,410 (89%)
Southern	7,005	5,114	3,074 (60%)	3,720 (73%)	4,195 (82%)
Eastern	5,760	4,200	1,768 (42%)	2,409 (57%)	3,011 (72%)
North Central	5,101	3,650	2,538 (70%)	2,863 (78%)	3,161 (87%)
Not Categorised by Division	11,768	9,621	7,771 (81%)	8,164 (85%)	8,611 (90%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>53,559</b>	<b>38,273</b>	<b>23,653 (62%)</b>	<b>27,556 (72%)</b>	<b>31,087 (81%)</b>

Currently, the Garda Síochána aims to respond to 65% of all CAD calls in the DMR within fifteen minutes and respond to 90% of all such calls within 30 minutes. These targets are of limited value because they do not differentiate between emergency and non-emergency calls. (In practice, emergency calls get priority.)

As regards actual Garda response times, the Inspectorate analysed data on the 53,559 emergency calls (i.e. CAD calls categorised at “Emergency” and “Category 1” calls) received in the DMR in 2007.<sup>111</sup> Unfortunately, full analysis of the data was not possible because an “At Scene” time is recorded for only 38,273 or 72% of these calls. Table 3 shows that, of the latter 38,273 calls, the Garda Síochána responded to 31,087 (81%) within fifteen minutes.

The Inspectorate went a step further in analysing emergency response times in each of the six divisions of the DMR (see Table 3). In this case, full analysis was not possible because only 28,652 call records, which included an “At Scene” time, were categorised by division. The analysis indicated significant variation in response times across the divisions. The DMR South Central Division, which is the smallest in geographical area of the six DMR divisions, succeeded in responding to 89% of

emergencies within fifteen minutes. The equivalent figure for the DMR Western Division, which has the highest call load of all the DMR divisions, was 68%. The Inspectorate believes that implementation of the recommendations of this report will result in considerable improvement in current Garda response times in the DMR.

## Setting New Response-Time Targets

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Charter should set response-time targets for emergency and non-emergency calls. The targets should include dispatch-time targets for control room staff.

Setting response-time targets for inclusion in the Garda Charter is a matter for policy decision. Two factors need to be taken into account. First, the lower the target times, the greater will be the resources required to achieve them. Second, the targets should be achievable within about one third of the total working time of front-line, uniformed Gardaí. This ensures that sufficient time remains available for proactive policing and administrative tasks (see Chapter 6).

Emergency and non-emergency callers should be given an estimated time of arrival of a Garda unit. In non-emergency situations, punctuality is more

<sup>111</sup> A total of 436,449 calls, emergency and non-emergency, were recorded on the CAD system in the DMR in respect of 2007. No data is available on emergency calls outside the DMR.

important than speed of response. If a Garda unit is unable to respond at an appointed time, the caller should be informed and a new appointment made. The Inspectorate believes that the Policing Pledge is a good template for the framing of non-emergency response in the Garda Charter.

In line with established practice in other jurisdictions, call takers should be trained to identify calls that do not necessitate dispatch of a Garda unit. In those cases, calls should be routed to a Garda helpdesk (see page 46) which can give callers appropriate advice, assistance and/or information.

## Call Answering Targets

It is now common practice for police services to publish target times for answering emergency calls. Typically, the target answering time is ten seconds for 100% of emergency calls and, in most cases, actual performance exceeds 90%.<sup>112</sup> Target answering times for non-emergency calls vary from twenty to forty seconds.

In Ireland, answering times for “999” calls are determined from the first ring in a Garda location and do not include the time it takes for a telecoms operator to answer and transfer the call. In 2007, 76% of “999” calls in the DMR were answered within seven seconds. In Cork City Division, the target is to answer 65% of “999” calls within fifteen seconds and 80% within twenty seconds. In 2008, the Cork City control room answered 96% of all “999” calls within 20 seconds.

The Garda Charter should set the target answering time for all “999” calls at the international norm of ten seconds. In due course, a target answering time of thirty seconds should be set for all calls to the proposed non-emergency Garda telephone number.

It is important to note that the Garda Síochána and many police services elsewhere rely on contracted intermediaries (telecoms operators) to answer “999” calls. Therefore, target answering times can be misleading to the community. The targets do not reflect the time it takes for the contractor to answer the call and transfer it to the appropriate

police location. While the Inspectorate believes it is important for the Garda Síochána to develop, publish and monitor “999” call-answering times, it must be clear that the intermediaries also play a key role in timely response. As mentioned previously, going forward, the Garda Síochána should work in collaboration with other “blue-light” services in shared control rooms that would take calls directly from the public, avoiding loss of valuable time in emergency situations.

## Proactive Policing Targets

The Inspectorate supports the setting of targets for the amount of time to be spent by police officers on proactive duties. In England and Wales, the Policing Pledge requires that dedicated neighbourhood policing teams spend 80% of their time visibly working in the community. In the US, the Seattle Police Department aims to have all patrol officers spend about 30% of their time on proactive police duties.

A similar approach can be taken in the Garda Charter in relation to “regular” and community policing units in the Garda Síochána. Efficient and accurate measurement of performance against the targets will rely on availability of CAD technology.

## Recommendations

### Recommendation 25

The Inspectorate recommends that the Garda Charter should set response-time targets for emergency and non-emergency calls. The targets should include dispatch-time targets for control room staff.

### Recommendation 26

The Inspectorate recommends that emergency and non-emergency callers be given an estimated time of arrival of a Garda unit.

### Recommendation 27

The Inspectorate recommends that call takers be trained to identify calls that do not necessitate dispatch of a Garda unit. In those cases, calls should be routed to a Garda helpdesk (see recommendation 11) which can give callers appropriate advice, assistance and/or information.

<sup>112</sup> In the Inspectorate’s review of published statistics of thirty-eight police services in Britain, twenty-nine of them answered 90% or more of all emergency calls within ten seconds in 2007/2008.

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# APPENDIX 1

## Terms of Reference

### Allocation of Garda Resources and Development and Implementation of the Garda Charter

#### *a. Allocating Resources*

To examine and report on how the allocation of Garda resources can be improved. This will include

- an examination of the current system of managing the availability of resources within An Garda Síochána for front line operational duties;
- an analysis of the demand for policing services (emergency and non-emergency) and its distribution over time (through the day, week, and year). The geographical spread of such demand and the differing requirements in urban and rural locations should be examined;
- an examination of the current resource allocation system for members of An Garda Síochána, including rostering and overtime, to see how well resources are made available to match demand for services and other operational requirements;
- an examination of potential alternative resource allocation systems to see whether there can be improvements in the match between availability of resources and the workload;
- an examination of the consequences for resource allocation of issues such as special leave, term time working and medically restricted duties.

#### *b. Developing and implementing the Garda Charter*

- To advise on the development and implementation of the Garda Charter proposed in the Programme for Government which will set out targeted response times and levels of service which the public can expect including frequency of high visibility patrols in urban and rural communities.
- To examine data currently available and to make recommendations on improving data availability on response times and the levels of service (including frequency of high visibility patrols) provided by An Garda Síochána.
- To consider any similar service charters or relevant systems operating in other police services and to report on how the experience in those services can be used in developing and implementing a system in Ireland.
- To recommend on how a system can be implemented incrementally having regard to the availability of resources and the systems for the deployment of such resources.

# APPENDIX 2

## Reports Reviewed

Calgary Police Service, Patrol Staffing Assessment, Bellmio, P. (2004)

Diary of a Police Officer, UK Home Office, (2001) (<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prs149.pdf>)

From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing Our Communities Together,

(2008) ([http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-reform/Policing\\_GP/](http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-reform/Policing_GP/))

Garda Establishment Distribution Model, (2001)

Garda SMI Implementation Steering Group, Final Report, Stationery Office, Dublin (2004)

Neighborhood Policing Staffing Plan 2008-2012, Seattle Police Department, (2007) ([http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/issues/policing/PDF/NeighborhoodPolicing\\_2007\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.seattle.gov/mayor/issues/policing/PDF/NeighborhoodPolicing_2007_FINAL.pdf))

OECD Public Management Reviews, IRELAND, Towards an Integrated Public Service, (2008) ([http://www.bettergov.ie/attached\\_files/upload/IRELAND-Towards%20An%20Integrated%20Public%20Service.pdf](http://www.bettergov.ie/attached_files/upload/IRELAND-Towards%20An%20Integrated%20Public%20Service.pdf))

OPEN ALL HOURS, A thematic inspection report on the role of police visibility and accessibility in public reassurance, UK Home Office, (2001) ([http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/community-policing/open\\_all\\_hours\\_.pdf?view=Binary](http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/community-policing/open_all_hours_.pdf?view=Binary))

Patrol Deployment Study, Vancouver Police Department, (2007) (<http://vancouver.ca/police/Planning/PatrolDeploymentStudy.pdf>)

Proposed Framework for Rostering in the Garda Síochána, (1998)

Study of Police Resource Management and Rostering Arrangements, UK Home Office (2004) ([http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-reform/HO\\_police\\_rostering.pdf](http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-reform/HO_police_rostering.pdf))

The Garda Síochána, Review of Organisation Structures and Service Delivery, Final Report: July 02

Use of Small Area Population Statistics in An Garda Síochána, Jack Swan, Institute of Public Administration, Dublin (2005)

# APPENDIX 3

Garda Numbers, by Rank, on 1 January in each of the Years 1999 to 2009

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Net Increase from 1/1/99 to 1/1/09
Commissioner	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
D/Commissioner	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
A/Commissioner	10	10	10	10	10	10	11	12	11	12	12	2
C/Superintendent	46	46	46	46	47	47	47	47	46	52	52	6
Superintendent	168	168	169	171	171	173	168	173	166	185	187	19
Inspector	262	263	293	288	294	294	291	288	287	330	344	82
Sergeant	1,866	1,876	1,897	1,934	1,928	1,946	1,950	1,926	1,945	2,083	2,229	363
Garda	8,880	9,092	9,222	9,363	9,442	9,544	9,739	9,815	10,496	11,090	11,585	2,705
Total All Ranks	11,235	11,458	11,640	11,815	11,895	12,017	12,209	12,264	12,954	13,755	14,412	3,177
Increase in Garda Numbers Since 1 January of the Previous Year		223	182	175	80	122	192	55	690	801	657	

Source: Garda Síochána

# APPENDIX 4

## Age/Gender Profile of Members of the Garda Síochána on 1 January 2009

Age	Numbers of Members of the Garda Síochána		
	Male	Female	Totals
<25	934 (6.5%)	460 (3.2%)	1,394 (9.7%)
25-29	2,108 (14.6%)	1,046 (7.3%)	3,154 (21.9%)
30-34	1,889 (13.1%)	747 (5.2%)	2,636 (18.3%)
35-39	1,518 (10.5%)	448 (3.1%)	1,966 (13.6%)
40-44	984 (6.8%)	158 (1.1%)	1,142 (7.9%)
45-49	1,954 (13.6%)	206 (1.4%)	2,160 (15%)
50+	1,895 (13.1%)	65 (0.5%)	1,960 (13.6%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>11,282 (78.2%)</b>	<b>3,130 (21.8%)</b>	<b>14,412 (100%)</b>

Source: Garda Síochána

## Service/Gender Profile of Members of the Garda Síochána on 1 January 2009

	Years of Service							Totals
	<5	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+	
Male	2,874	1,734	1,579	878	788	1,851	1,578	11,282
Female	1,376	775	472	218	92	168	29	3,130
<b>Totals</b>	<b>4,250</b>	<b>2,509</b>	<b>2,051</b>	<b>1,096</b>	<b>880</b>	<b>2,019</b>	<b>1,607</b>	<b>14,412</b>

Source: Garda Síochána

# APPENDIX 5

Distribution of Members of the Garda Síochána, 1999, 2004 and 2009

	Garda Síochána Numbers, All Ranks, on 1 January		
	1999	2004	2009
Garda Headquarters, Including Garda College and Garda Síochána Information Centre	1,084	973	1,059
Regional Resources	202	237	260
National Support Units	428	861	904
<b>Garda Divisions</b>			
Carlow/Kildare	242	270	376
Cavan/Monaghan	368	377	418
Clare	234	245	337
Cork City	557	617	675
Cork North	239	245	299
Cork Western	234	241	309
DMR Eastern	382	358	471
DMR Northern	613	632	783
DMR North Central	594	635	715
DMR Southern	474	538	640
DMR South Central	705	681	787
DMR Western	542	626	788
Donegal	450	424	488
Galway West	324	345	453
Kerry	242	266	341
Laois/Offaly	281	272	336
Limerick	427	472	634
Longford/Westmeath	238	243	341
Louth*	261*	253*	296
Mayo	262	274	329
Meath*	221*	228*	301
Roscommon/Galway East	241	248	294
Sligo/Leitrim	260	267	318
Tipperary	306	313	384
Waterford/Kilkenny	322	347	457
Wexford*	237*	252*	278
Wicklow*	265*	277*	341
<b>Totals for Garda Divisions</b>	<b>9,521</b>	<b>9,946</b>	<b>12,189</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>11,235</b>	<b>12,017</b>	<b>14,412</b>

\* These divisions were established since 2004. The 1999 and 2004 strengths shown are notional divisional strengths based on the numbers of Gardaí (all ranks) who served at the stations comprising those divisions on 1 January of those years. Further boundary changes since 1 January, 2009 are not reflected in this table.

Source: Garda Síochána

# APPENDIX 6

## Reasons for Calling to Garda Stations

– Extract From a 2002 Consultancy Report Prepared for the Garda Síochána

“A survey of all stations in the DMR for one week was conducted between 6am on 1 March and 6am on 7 March. This survey consisted of a log of all callers by time and day of calling and the reasons for calling. A summary of the findings is shown in Figure 6.1.

**FIGURE 6.1**

**Reasons for Calling–Overall Percentage Breakdown**

Region	Report Crime/ Incident	Produce Documents	Named Garda	Garda Signature	Visit Prisoner	Bail Book	Advice Directions	Other	Total Number of Callers
DMR	9%	7%	12%	35%	2%	7%	15%	11%	25,388
SER <sup>113</sup>	5%	4%	5%	44%	1%	3%	19%	19%	5,940

The main reason for calling during the period of the survey, which represented almost 9,000 callers to Garda stations and accounted for 35% (DMR) and 44% (SER) of all callers, was [to obtain] a Garda signature on a form. These were mainly motor tax renewal forms and passports. Less than 9% of callers reported crimes or incidents.

**FIGURE 6.2**

**Times of Callers**

Region	08.00 to 12.00	12.00 to 16.00	16.00 to 20.00	20.00 to 22.00	22.00 to 24.00	24.00 To 04.00	04.00 to 08.00
DMR	22%	31%	25%	11%	5%	3%	3%
SER (24 hr. stations)	29%	38%	22%	6%	3%	1%	1%

Taking into account the times of callers the survey shows that in the DMR about 11% of all callers do so between 10pm and 8am. In the SER this figure is less than 5%. If we consider the reason why people called to the stations between 10pm and 8am an interesting picture emerges, which questions whether there is a real requirement for the stations to be open as indicated in Figure 6.3:

FIGURE 6.3

## Percentage of callers between 10pm and 8am

Category of Caller	Description	DMR % of all after hours callers	SER % of all after hours callers
A	To report crime/incident	14% <sup>114</sup>	13%
B	Produce documents	8%	4%
C	Require Garda signature	24%	17%
D	Visit/enquire about prisoner	4%	6%
E	Sign bail book	8%	3%
F	Ask advice/directions	18%	30%
G	Called for named Garda	13%	6%
H	Other	10%	22%
<b>Total</b>		<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

If a station were to be closed during the hours of 10pm and 8am, then categories B, C, D, E and F could be discounted as this type of business could be conducted during daytime opening hours... [If] meetings with named Gardaí (category G) were rescheduled and some proportion of other callers (category H) were extracted, then it could be said that only a small proportion of callers to stations after hours could be said to demand an immediate service.”

<sup>114</sup> It should be noted that the percentages in this table relate only to persons who called to stations in the DMR and SER between 10p.m. and 8a.m. Accordingly, for example, the 14% of persons who called to a DMR station between 10p.m. and 8a.m. to report a crime/incident represent only 1.5% of all callers over the twenty-four hours, i.e. 14% of 11% = 1.5%.


# APPENDIX 7

## Survey of Administrative Services Provided to Callers to Blanchardstown Garda Station

The survey was carried out by local Garda management from 3 to 9 April, 2006. It recorded the purpose(s) for which 1,723 people called to the station during that period. The results showed that almost 63% of callers simply wished to have a form countersigned, collect a form or produce documents. Just over 11% called to report a crime. Less than 7% of people called to meet a Garda.

**FIGURE E:**

**Purposes for Which 1,723 Persons Called in Person to Blanchardstown Garda Station During 3 to 9 April, 2006<sup>115</sup>**



The Inspectorate has no reason to believe that the kinds of transactions carried out at Blanchardstown station are any different to those at any other station. The nature of those transactions is such that, as in other jurisdictions, they can be handled effectively without reliance on police powers.

<sup>115</sup> Survey of Persons Calling to Blanchardstown Garda Station – April, 2006, Garda Síochána, Blanchardstown

# APPENDIX 8

## Estimated Maximum Impact of Centrally-Authorised Garda Síochána Leave Schemes on Garda Attendance in 2007

Leave Scheme	Numbers of Members who Aailed of Leave	Maximum Leave Entitlement (Days)	Maximum Number of "Leave" Days Taken (Column 2 x Column 3)	Maximum Number of Leave Days Taken Expressed as a Percentage of Total Garda Síochána Workdays**	Maximum Number of Leave Days Taken Expressed as the Equivalent Number of Full-Time Members of the Garda Síochána***
Parental Leave	210*	70	14,700	0.470	64.76
Job sharing	115	113.5	13,053	0.420	57.50
Career Break	42	227	9,534	0.310	42.00
Maternity Leave (without pay)	83	80	6,640	0.213	29.25
Term Time	24	65	1,560	0.050	6.87
Special Leave without Pay	8	40	320	0.010	1.41
Adoptive leave	1	70	70	0.002	0.31
Special Leave with Pay	9	3	27	0.001	0.12
<b>Totals</b>	<b>492</b>		<b>45,904</b>	<b>1.476</b>	<b>202.22</b>

\* The 2007 number was not available. This is the annual average of the number of members granted parental leave in the five years from 1 January, 2004 to 31 December, 2008.

\*\* There was a total of 3,122,453 Garda Síochána Workdays in 2007

\*\*\* The equivalent numbers of full-time members were calculated on the basis of annual attendance for 227 days i.e. 365 less 104 rest days and 34 days annual leave.

# APPENDIX 9

## Impact of Locally-Authorised Garda Síochána Leave Schemes on Garda Attendance in 2007 in the Five Garda Divisions Visited in the Course of the Inspection

Leave Scheme	Number of Leave Days Taken	Leave Days Taken Expressed as a Percentage of Members' Total Workdays in the Five Divisions (675,487) in 2007	Estimated Number of Leave Days in the Garda Síochána as a Whole in 2007*	Estimated Leave Days Taken in the Garda Síochána as a Whole Expressed as the Equivalent Number of Full-Time Members **
Maternity Leave (with pay)	3,561	0.527	16,455	72.48
Study/Exam Leave	1,458	0.215	6,713	29.57
Representative Body Leave			6,000***	26.43
Paternity Leave	177	0.026	812	3.58
Force Majeur	121	0.017	531	2.34
Transfer Leave	32	0.005	156	0.69
<b>Totals</b>	<b>5,349</b>	<b>0.790**</b>	<b>30,667</b>	<b>135.09</b>

\* The figures in this column were calculated by applying the percentages in the previous column to the Members' total workdays in 2007(3,122,453). For example, the estimated number of maternity leave days taken in the Garda Síochána as a whole in 2007 was 16,455 (3,122,453 x 0.527%).

\*\* The equivalent numbers of full-time members were calculated on the basis of annual attendance for 227 days i.e. 365 less 104 rest days and 34 days' annual leave. For example,

$$16,455/227 = 72.48.$$

\*\*\* This estimate was calculated on the basis of Garda Code provisions rather than on information collected in the five Garda divisions visited.

# APPENDIX 10

## Average Number of Garda Síochána Shifts Lost in 2007 Through Sickness, Long-Term Sickness and Injuries of Duty

	Average Number of Working Shifts Lost per Officer in 2007 Through Sickness (Excluding Long-Term Sickness and Injury on Duty)	Average Number of Working Shifts Lost per Officer in 2007 Through Long-Term Sickness <sup>116</sup>	Average Number of Working Shifts Lost per Officer in 2007 Through Injury on Duty	Totals
Garda Headquarters, including Garda College	6.80	2.00	0.32	9.12
Regional Resources	4.91	0.30	6.55	11.75
National Support Units	6.05	2.38	0.39	8.82
<b>Garda Divisions</b>				
Carlow/Kildare	8.36	2.43	0.58	11.37
Cavan/Monaghan	9.02	1.66	2.44	13.12
Clare	5.88	3.39	1.12	10.39
Cork City	7.44	1.32	1.91	10.67
Cork North	4.87	3.86	1.25	9.98
Cork West	4.93	2.60	2.13	9.67
D.M.R. Eastern	2.38	1.04	0.27	3.70
D.M.R. North Central	6.01	1.59	0.77	8.36
D.M.R. Northern	2.53	2.54	1.35	6.43
D.M.R. South Central	7.07	2.31	0.99	10.37
D.M.R. Southern	4.84	0.69	0.23	5.75
D.M.R. Western	6.12	2.59	1.00	9.71
Donegal	9.59	1.69	2.72	13.99
Galway West	4.88	3.53	2.03	10.44
Kerry	9.02	0.82	1.83	11.66
Laois/Offaly	7.51	2.79	1.46	11.77
Limerick	7.76	2.41	1.38	11.55
Longford/Westmeath	6.13	1.89	1.65	9.67
Louth/Meath	7.57	4.43	3.93	15.93
Mayo	6.93	2.34	0.65	9.92
Roscommon/Galway E.	7.77	2.10	3.02	12.89
Sligo/Leitrim	8.12	2.88	0.60	11.60
Tipperary	8.52	2.47	4.51	15.50
Waterford/Kilkenny	6.53	3.97	2.51	13.01
Wexford/Wicklow	7.69	2.43	1.42	11.55
<b>Garda Síochána as a whole</b>	<b>6.44</b>	<b>2.26</b>	<b>1.49</b>	<b>10.19</b>

Source: Garda Síochána

<sup>116</sup> Garda records of long-term sick leave do not include absences arising from injuries incurred while off duty


# APPENDIX 11

## Distribution of Garda Síochána Overtime (Hours) in 2007

	Numbers of Overtime Hours	Percentage of Total Overtime Hours
Garda Headquarters, including Garda College	172,771	5.73%
Regional Resources	215,444	7.15%
National Support Units	233,732	7.75%
<b>Garda Divisions</b>		
Carlow/Kildare	62,026	2.06%
Cavan/Monaghan	66,035	2.19%
Clare	65,114	2.16%
Cork City	66,924	2.22%
Cork North	33,036	1.10%
Cork West	40,360	1.34%
DMR Eastern	114,066	3.78%
DMR Northern	223,265	7.41%
DMR North Central	204,567	6.79%
DMR Southern	109,750	3.64%
DMR South Central	212,408	7.05%
DMR Western	271,749	9.01%
Donegal	70,134	2.33%
Galway West	55,526	1.84%
Kerry	45,633	1.51%
Laois/Offaly	81,156	2.69%
Limerick	106,182	3.52%
Longford/Westmeath	74,295	2.46%
Louth / Meath	117,736	3.91%
Mayo	44,162	1.46%
Roscommon/Galway East	51,932	1.72%
Sligo/Leitrim	62,842	2.08%
Tipperary	72,643	2.41%
Waterford/Kilkenny	61,235	2.03%
Wexford / Wicklow	79,895	2.65%
Sub Total for Garda Divisions	2,392,671	79.37%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>3,014,618</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

# APPENDIX 12

## Example of a Police Demand/Resources Profile



### NOTE

In this example, the police service in question has managed to maintain staffing levels in its response teams for the coming seven days that, for the most part, are greater than or equal to preferred staffing levels. The objective of the service’s resource management team is to achieve demand/resources profiles that do not include “red” areas, i.e. times when resources are below the preferred response staffing level such as 15.00 to 19.00 hours on 20/3/09 in the example above.

# APPENDIX 13

Policing Pledge Template Published by the UK Home Office<sup>117</sup>

## POLICING PLEDGE



**THE POLICE SERVICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES WILL SUPPORT LAW ABIDING CITIZENS AND PURSUE CRIMINALS RELENTLESSLY TO KEEP YOU AND YOUR NEIGHBOURHOODS SAFE FROM HARM. WE WILL:**

1. Always treat you fairly with dignity and respect ensuring you have fair access to our services at a time that is reasonable and suitable for you.
2. Provide you with information to you know who your dedicated Neighbourhood Policing Team is, where they are based, how to contact them and how to work with them.
3. Ensure your Neighbourhood Policing Team and other police patrols are visible and on your patch at times when they will be most effective and when you tell us you most need them. We will ensure your team are not taken away from neighbourhood business more than is absolutely necessary. They will spend at least 80% of their time visibly working in your neighbourhood, tackling your priorities. Staff turnover will be minimised.
4. Respond to every message directed to your Neighbourhood Policing Team within 24 hours and, where necessary, provide a more detailed response as soon as we can.
5. Aim to answer 999 calls within 10 seconds, deploying to emergencies immediately giving an estimated time of arrival, getting to you safely and as quickly as possible. In what areas, we will aim to get to you within 15 minutes and in rural areas within 30 minutes.
6. Answer all non-emergency calls promptly. If attendance is needed, send a patrol giving you an estimated time of arrival, and:
  - If you are vulnerable or aged aim to be with you within 60 minutes.
  - If you are talking about an issue that we have agreed with your community will be a neighbourhood priority (listed opposite) and attendance is required, we will aim to be with you within 60 minutes.
  - Alternatively, if appropriate, we will make an appointment to see you at a time that fits in with your life and within 48 hours.
  - If agreed that attendance is not necessary we will give you advice, answer your questions and/or put you in touch with someone who can help.
7. Arrange regular public meetings to agree your priorities, at least once a month, giving you a chance to meet your local team with other members of your community. These will include opportunities such as requests, street meetings and mobile police station visits which will be arranged to meet local needs and requirements. Your local arrangements can be found opposite.
8. Provide monthly updates on progress, and on local crime and policing issues. This will include the provision of crime maps, information on specific crimes and what happened to those brought to justice, details of what action we and our partners are taking to make your neighbourhood safer and information on how your force is performing.
9. If you have been a victim of crime agree with you how often you would like to be kept informed of progress in your case and for how long. You have the right to be kept informed at least every month if you wish and for as long as is reasonable.
10. Acknowledge any dissatisfaction with the service you have received within 24 hours of reporting it to us. To help us fully resolve the matter, discuss with you how it will be handled, give you an opportunity to talk in person to someone about your concerns and agree with you what will be done about them and how quickly.

**WE WANT TO DO OUR BEST FOR YOU BUT IF WE FAIL TO MEET OUR PLEDGE WE WILL ALWAYS EXPLAIN WHY IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE ON THAT OCCASION TO DELIVER THE HIGH STANDARDS TO WHICH WE ASPIRE AND YOU DESERVE.**

### YOUR LOCAL NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING TEAM IS:



PCSO Kaseah Smith



PC Adam Jones



PCSO Chris James

The team work in co-operation with Neighbourhood Manager Alison Smith.

We can be contacted by phone Tel:0114 425 4367 and e-mail [neighbourhoodpolicing@force.police.uk](mailto:neighbourhoodpolicing@force.police.uk) and will hold monthly public meetings at the Your Road Community centre, on the second Saturday of every month at 10pm.

If you call the team and have a voicemail or send an email we will get back to you at the latest within 24 hours.

#### Who to call when

Call the team when you have a non-urgent, local crime or anti-social behaviour problem that you would like them to deal with.

Call 999 if you have an emergency that requires urgent police attention.

Call the 24-hour non-emergency force call centre 0800 678 3123 if you have a non-urgent, non-neighbourhood issue.

We will take every effort to preserve confidentiality and will not call you back or visit you without checking this with you first.

#### Local Priorities for action and information

Your locally agreed priorities are:

1. Street level drug dealing on the high street
2. Youth related anti-social behaviour at the shopping centre
3. Fly tipping on the common

Every month we will produce crime maps of your area together with information about specific crimes and criminals and action to deal with your priorities. This information will be given at the public meetings as well as published on the force website [www.force.police.uk](http://www.force.police.uk) and more detail will be provided by a quarterly newsletter delivered to each household.

#### Complaints

You may raise a complaint in a number of ways:

- at the public meetings;
- direct to the neighbourhood policing team by phone, by e-mail – we will get back to you within 24hrs; and
- direct to the force/Chief Constable by phone, e-mail or letter – this will be acknowledged within 24hrs of receipt and the next steps explained to you.

The police acknowledge any complaint about our service within 24 hours, tell you how it will be handled, give you an opportunity to talk in person to someone about your concerns and tell you what we are going to do about it.

117 Accessible at [http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-reform/Policing\\_Pledge.pdf?view=Binary](http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/police-reform/Policing_Pledge.pdf?view=Binary)